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Abstract
This thesis contains three essays in evolutionary game theory.
In the first chapter, we study the impact of switching costs on the long run outcome
in 2×2 coordination games played in the circular city model of local interactions. We
find that for low levels of switching costs, the risk dominant convention is the unique
long run equilibrium. For intermediate levels of switching costs the set of long run
equilibria contains the risk dominant convention but may also contain conventions
that are not risk dominant. For high levels of switching costs also nonmonomorphic
states will be included in the set of LRE.
We study the impact of location heterogeneity on neighborhood segregation in
the one-dimensional Schelling residential model in the second chapter. We model
location heterogeneity by introducing an advantageous node, in which a player’s
utility is impartial to the composition of her neighborhood. We find that when every
player interacts with two neighbors, one advantageous node in the circular city will
lead to a result that segregation is no longer the unique LRE. When players interact
with more neighbors, more advantageous nodes are necessary to obtain the same
result.
In the third chapter, we consider a model of social coordination and network for-
mation, where players of two groups play a 2×2 coordination game when connected.
Players in one group actively decide on whom they play with and on the action in
the game, while players in the other group decide on the action in the game only.
We find that if either group’s population size is small in comparison to the linking
restriction, all players will choose the risk dominant equilibrium, while when both
groups are sufficiently large in population, the players of two groups will coordinate
on the payoff dominant action.
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Abstract
We study the impact of switching costs on the long run outcome in 2×2
coordination games played in the circular city model of local interactions.
For low levels of switching costs the predictions are in line with the pre-
vious literature and the risk dominant convention is the unique long run
equilibrium. For intermediate levels of switching costs the set of long run
equilibria still contains the risk dominant convention but may also contain
conventions that are not risk dominant. The set of long run equilibria may
further be non-monotonic in the level of switching costs, i.e. as switching
costs increase the prediction that the risk dominant convention is unique
long run equilibrium and the prediction that both conventions are long run
equilibria alternate. Finally, for high levels of switching costs also non-
monomorphic states will be included in the set of long run equilibria.
21 Introduction
It is often costly to switch to a different technology or adopt a new social norm. For
instance, switching from Windows to Apple requires not only getting familiarized
to the new system but also moving files from one computer to the other. Further
examples of switching costs include communicating one’s new telephone number when
switching providers in telecommunication or buying new tools when switching from
inch screws to metric screws.
The present paper aims to understand the role of switching costs on long run tech-
nology choice and the emergence of conventions. Since agents are better off when
interacting with somebody who uses the same operating system, telecommunication
provider, or industry standard, these situations typically give rise to coordination
games. A wide range of models, starting with the seminal works of Kandori, Mailath
and Rob (1993) and Young (1993), have analyzed settings where a population of
boundedly rational players decide on their actions in such coordination games using
simple heuristics.1 The message that emerges from these discussions is that, when
players use best response learning, risk dominant strategies -that perform well against
mixed strategy profiles will emerge in the long run, even in the presence of payoff
dominant strategies. In the context of the above examples, this implies that popula-
tions do not necessarily end up with technologies which maximize social welfare.
Norman (2009) has already analyzed the role of switching costs in a global inter-
actions setting where everybody interacts with everybody else. In the global setting
switching costs turned out to influence the speed at which the population approaches
the long run equilibrium (LRE). The long run prediction remain unaffected, though.
Quite frequently interactions are, however, local in nature, with interaction partners
corresponding to family members, friends, or work colleagues. For instance, in the
above examples on switching operating systems or telecommunication providers it is
1 See Weidenholzer (2010) for a survey of the literature.
3typically the case that this decision will to a larger degree be influenced by one’s con-
tacts or collaborators than by the overall distribution of technologies in the society.
We capture such local interactions by considering a model akin to the one proposed
by Ellison (1993) where the agents are arranged around a circle and interact with
their neighbors only. We focus on a setting where one strategy is risk dominant and
the other strategy may or may not be payoff dominant. This allows us to analyze
circumstances under which strategies that are neither payoff- nor risk- dominant are
selected. When determining which strategy to use the players play a best response
to the distribution of play in their neighborhood in the previous period taking into
account that switching strategies incurs a cost. In addition, choices are perturbed by
occasional uniform (across agents and time) mistakes.
We find that low levels of switching costs do not change the predictions of the
model as compared to the standard model without switching costs. The risk dom-
inant strategy is still able to spread contagiously, starting from a small cluster and
eventually taking over the whole population. However, for larger switching costs
risk dominant strategies may no longer spread contagiously and non-monomorphic
states, where different strategies coexist, become absorbing. The reason is that a
player at the boundary of a risk dominant cluster will not switch under sufficiently
high switching costs. It is possible to move among all of these non-monomorphic
absorbing states via a chain of single mutations. Transitions from different states to
each others are, thus, characterized by step-by-step evolution as outlined in Ellison
(2000).
The question which state will be LRE essentially boils down to how difficult the
set of non-monomorphic states is to access from the two monomorphic states. In-
terestingly, if agents only interact with a few neighbors, there may exist a range
of parameters where alongside the risk dominant convention also non-risk dominant
conventions are LRE. Thus, switching costs may lead to the model’s prediction no
longer being unique. The reason behind this phenomenon is that under the uniform
4noise approach the number of mutations required to move from a convention to the
set of non-monomorphic absorbing states is measured in integers. Especially if agents
only interact with a few neighbors, it may happen that the number of mistakes re-
quired to access the set of non-monomorphic absorbing states from the risk dominant
convention equals the number of mistakes required to access this set from the non-risk
dominant convention.
Perhaps even more interestingly, also owing to the fact the mutations are mea-
sured in integers, the prediction might be non-monotonic in the level of switching
costs. That is, the prediction that the risk dominant convention is selected and the
prediction that both conventions are selected alternate as switching costs increase.
This curiosity is caused by i) the stepwise nature of rounding up and ii) by the fact
that the number of mistakes required to leave the risk dominant convention and the
number of mistakes required to leave the non-risk dominant convention only differ by
a constant.
Finally, for very high levels of switching costs no player will switch in the absence
of noise even if all neighbors choose the other strategy. Thus, all states are absorbing
and can be connected via a chain of single mutations. Consequently, all absorbing
states turn out to be LRE.
For large interaction neighborhoods the integer problem ceases to have impact and
the risk dominant convention remains as unique LRE. In particular, this holds true if
every agent interacts with every other agent and a sufficiently large population, thus,
reconciling our results with those of Norman (2009).
If one takes the model’s predictions at face value, it may contribute to our under-
standing of the emergence and survival of (risk dominated) technology standards or
norms. If the risk dominant strategy is not payoff dominant, then the presence of
switching costs implies that payoff dominant conventions will be observed with pos-
itive probability in the long run. Switching cost might, thus, be welfare improving.
If, however, a strategy is both risk- and payoff- dominant the presence of switch-
5ing costs may lead to (risk- and payoff-) dominated strategies surviving in the long
run. Switching costs and local interactions may, thus, also explain why inefficient
technology standards or norms survive in the long run.
A more pessimistic reading of our results is that the local interaction model may
lose traction in the presence of switching costs as it can no longer give a clear cut
prediction. This is expressed by the non-uniqueness of the long run prediction but
even more aggravated by the non-monotonicity of the prediction. While the risk
dominant convention ceases to be unique LRE for high enough switching costs it
might be again unique LRE for even higher switching costs. This is bad news since the
circular city model of local interactions has some otherwise nice features as compared
to the global model: i) It was observed by Ellison (1993) that in contrast to the global
interaction model of Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993) it features a high speed of
convergence. ii) Lee, Szeidl, and Valentinyi (2003) have shown that it is immune
against the Bergin and Lipman (1996) critique. iii) Weidenholzer (2012) has shown
that it is robust to the addition and deletion of dominated strategies, a test which
Kim and Wong (2010) have shown the global model fails.
The paper closest related to our work is Norman (2009) who studies switching
costs in the context of a global interactions model. As already observed by Kandori,
Mailath, and Rob (1993) a major drawback of the global interactions model lies in its
low speed of convergence. Under global interactions the number of mistakes required
to move from one convention to another turns out to depend on the population
size. Thus, in large populations it is questionable whether the long run limit will be
observed within any reasonable time horizon.2 Norman (2009) shows how switching
costs might speed up convergence. As in the present paper, the presence of switching
costs implies that non-monomorphic states where agents use different actions become
2 Ellison (1993) pointed out that in the context of local interactions where some strategies might spread contagiously
the speed of convergence is independent of the population size and, thus, the LRE might be a reasonable predictor
even in large populations.
6absorbing. This enables a transition from one convention to another by first accessing
the class of non-monomorphic states and then moving through this class via a chain
of single mutations to the other convention. Under switching cost the step from one
convention to the set of non-monomorphic states is typically smaller than the direct
step from that convention to the other. Consequently, switching costs may speed up
the convergence to the long run prediction.
While the present paper adds to the ongoing discussion on learning in coordination
games it also contributes to a wider discussion on how far received results in the
literature on learning in games are robust to (minor) modifications. For instance,
under imitation learning changing the interaction or information structures may result
in different predictions in coordination games (see Robson and Vega-Redondo (1996)
and Alós-Ferrer and Weidenholzer (2006), (2008)) or prisoner dilemma games (see
Eshel, Samuelson, and Shaked (1998), Mengel (2009)). Similarly, in Cournot games
a number of contributions have analyzed conditions under which firms converge to
the Walrasian state under imitation learning, as predicted by Vega-Redondo (1997).
Alós-Ferrer (2004) shows that when agents have memory over the last two periods
the Walrasian state is no longer uniquely stochastically stable.3 Apesteguia, Huck,
Oechssler, and Weidenholzer (2010) find that, if there are differences in cost functions,
all monomorphic states are absorbing. However, the Walrasian state remains unique
LRE if no firm is the uniquely cheapest one, as shown by Tanaka (1999).
The rest of this paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 presents the
model and discusses the main techniques used. Section 3 spells out our main results
and Section 4 concludes.
3 Alós-Ferrer and Shi (2012) consider asymmetric memory which turns out to affect equilibrium selection in
coordination games but reinforces the stability of the Walrasian state in Cournot games.
72 The model
We consider a population of N agents who are located on a circle, as in Ellison (1993).
A given agent i has agents i−1 and i+1 (mod N) as immediate neighbors. Each agent
interacts with her k closest neighbors to the left and to the right of her. We assume
k ≤ N−1
2
to ensure that no agent interacts with herself. Thus, agent i’s interactions
are confined to the set of playersN(i) = {i−k, i−k+1 . . . , i−1, i+1, . . . , i+k−1, i+k}.
The agents in the set N(i) are called neighbors of i.
We assume |N | to be odd. This allows us to nest global interactions in our frame-
work by setting k = N−1
2
.4
Each agent i plays a 2×2 coordination game with strategy set S = {A,B} against
all agents in her neighborhood N(i). We denote by u(si, sj) the payoff agent i with
strategy si receives when playing against agent j with strategy sj. We follow Eshel,
Samuelson and Shaked (1998) and consider the following (normalized) coordination
game.
A B
A α, α β, 0
B 0, β 1, 1
We assume α > 0 and β < 1, so that (A,A) and (B,B) are both strict Nash
equilibria. Further, we assume α + β > 1, so that the equilibrium (A,A) is risk
dominant in the sense of Harsanyi and Selten (1988), i.e. A is the unique best response
to a mixed strategy profile which puts equal probability on A and B. We denote by
q∗ =
1− β
1 + α− β
the critical mass put on A in a mixed strategy equilibrium. Risk dominance of the
Nash equilibrium (A,A) translates into q∗ < 1
2
. Note that if α > 1, (A,A) is payoff
4The results obtained for local interaction also hold for even populations.
8dominant and if α < 1, (B,B) is payoff dominant. However, no such assumption on
α is made at this stage.
The number of A-players in the population is denoted by m = #{i ∈ I|si = A}
and the number of A-players among agent i’s neighbors is denoted by mi = #{j ∈
N(i)|sj = A}. Accordingly, the number of B-players in the population is given by
N −m and the number of B-players in i’s interaction set is given by 2k −mi.
We denote by si(t) the strategy adopted by player i, by s(t) = (s1(t), . . . , sN(t))
the profile of strategies adopted by all players, and by
s−i(t) = (si−k(t), . . . , si−1(t), si+1(t), . . . , si+k(t))
the strategies adopted by all of player i’s neighbors in period t. Further, the monomor-
phic states (s, s, . . . , s) where all agents adopt the same strategy s are denoted by
−→s .
The payoff for player i is given by the average payoff received when interacting
with all neighbors.
Ui
(
si(t), s−i(t)
)
=
1
2k
∑
j∈N(i)
u
(
si(t), sj(t)
)
.
We consider a myopic best response process with switching costs . In each period
t = 1, 2, . . . each agent receives the opportunity to revise her strategy with exogenous
probability η ∈ (0, 1).5 Changing strategies is assumed to be costly. Whenever an
agent changes her strategy she is subject to a switching cost. We follow Norman
(2009) and consider switching costs c which are independent of the current action
choice and enter the payoff function in an additive way. 6 The following function
5Thus, we are considering a model of positive inertia where agents may not adjust their strategy every period.
6Alternative formulations of switching costs encompass situations where the level of switching costs depends on
the current strategy used or on the current level of payoffs.
9formalizes this idea
c (si(t), si(t+ 1)) =
 c if si(t) 6= si(t+ 1)0 if si(t) = si(t+ 1) .
When a revision opportunity arises an agent switches to a myopic best response,
i.e. she plays a best response to the distribution of play in her neighborhood in the
previous period, taking into account the switching costs. More formally, at time t+1,
when given revision opportunity, player i chooses
si(t+ 1) ∈ arg max
si(t+1)∈S
[
U
(
si(t+ 1), s−i(t)
)− c(si(t), si(t+ 1))].
If a player has multiple best replies, it is assumed that she randomly chooses one
of them with exogenously given probability. If she does not receive an opportunity
to revise her strategy, she chooses si(t + 1) = si(t). Further, with fixed probability
 > 0, independent across agents and across time, the agent ignores her prescription
and chooses a strategy at random, i.e. she makes a mistake or mutates.
We denote the state space by Ω and a state of the process by ω. The process with
mistakes is called perturbed process . Under the perturbed process any two states
can be reached from each other. Thus, the only absorbing set is the entire state
space, implying that the process is ergodic. The unique invariant distribution of this
process is denoted by µ(). We are interested in the limit invariant distribution (as the
rate of experimentation tends to zero), µ∗ = limε→0 µ(ε). Such a distribution exists
(see Foster and Young (1990), Young (1993), or Ellison (2000)) and is an invariant
distribution of the process without mistakes (the so called unperturbed process). It
gives a stable prediction for the original process, in the sense that for  small enough
the play approximates that described by µ∗ in the long run. The states in the support
of µ∗, are called Long Run Equilibria (LRE) or stochastically stable states. The set
of LRE is denoted by S = {ω ∈ Ω | µ∗(ω) > 0} . We use a characterization of the set
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of LRE due to Freidlin and Wentzell (1988).7 Consider two absorbing sets of states
X and Y and let C(X, Y ) > 0 (referred to as a transition cost) denote the minimal
number of mutations for a transition from the X to Y . An X-tree is a directed tree
such that the set of nodes is the set of all absorbing sets, and the tree is directed
into the root X. For a given tree one can calculate the cost as the sum of the costs
of transition for each edge. According to Freidlin and Wentzell (1988), a set X is a
LRE if and only if it is the root of a minimum cost tree.
3 The role of switching costs
In a first step we will study how switching costs influence the agent’s decision to
switch strategies. Consider an A-player. She will switch strategies with probability
one if her payoff from playing B minus the switching cost strictly exceeds her payoff
from remaining an A- player, i.e.
1
2k
(
miα + (2k −mi)β
)
<
1
2k
(
2k −mi
)
− c.
Rearranging terms yields
mi < 2kq
∗ − 2kc
1 + α− β := m
A(c, k).
An A-player will remain an A-player with certainty whenever mi > mA(c, k) and
will choose A and B with positive probability if mi = mA(c, k). As mA(c, k) is
the minimum number of A-playing neighbors such that keeping A is a unique best
response, it cannot be negative.
Likewise, consider a B-player. She will switch strategies with probability one if
the payoff from playing A minus the switching cost exceeds her current payoff, which
7See Fudenberg and Levine (1998) or Samuelson (1997) for textbook treatments. Ellison (2000) provides an
enhanced (and sometimes easier to apply) algorithm for identifying the set of LRE. We chose to work with the
original formulation as it allows for a characterization in case of multiple LRE.
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yields
mi > 2kq
∗ +
2kc
1 + α− β := m
B(c, k).
A B-player will remain a B-player if mi < mB(c, k), and will randomize between
the two strategies if mi = mB(c, k). Note that mB(c, k) is defined as the number of
A-players such that a player with less than mB(c, k) A-neighbors chooses to stay at
B with certainty and, thus, cannot exceed 2k.
Note that mA(0, k) = mB(0, k) = 2kq∗, i.e. in the absence of switching costs the
thresholds are the same as in Ellison’s (1993) model. For c > 0, we have mA(c, k) <
mA(0, k) = mB(0, k) < mB(c, k). Hence, in the presence of switching costs, it takes
more players of the other type to induce a switch than in the absence of switching
costs. Further, a B-player will require more A-opponents to switch strategies than
an A-player requires to stay at her strategy. Likewise, an A-player will switch to B
at a lower number of A-opponents than it takes a B-player to remain at her strategy.
Thus, switching costs create regions where players with the same distribution of play
in their neighborhood but with a different current strategy may behave differently.
This may lead to the emergence of non-monomorphic absorbing states where clusters
of players with different strategies coexist. In such states all players want to remain
at their current strategies, i.e. mi > mA(c, k) for all A-players and mj < mB(c, k) for
all B-players.
In the following, G denotes the set non-monomorphic absorbing states, i.e.
G = {s ∈ S|s 6= −→A,−→B ,mi > mA(c, k) ∀ i with si = A, and mj < mB(c, k) ∀ j with sj = B}.
and an element of this set is denoted by AB . Further, G` denotes the set of non-
monomorphic absorbing states with ` A-players (and N − ` B-players), i.e.
G` = {s ∈ G|m = `}.
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3.1 Two-neighbor interaction
In order to build intuition and to highlight the main mechanisms at work, our analysis
starts with an informal discussion of the special case where each agent only interacts
with her two most immediate neighbors, i.e. k = 1. A comprehensive analysis of the
case k ≥ 1 is provided in Section 3.2.
In a first step, let us consider under which circumstances non-monomorphic states
are absorbing. To this end, consider states where clusters of A-players and B-players,
each of at least size two, alternate, e.g.
. . . BBAABBBAAAA . . .
Players in the middle of such a cluster only interact with players of their own kind
and, hence, will never switch. Thus, let us focus on the boundary between two such
strings. Note that whenever mA(c, 1) < 1 holds the boundary A-player will keep her
strategy. This translates into 2c > 1−α−β, which is implied by risk dominance of A.
Thus, the boundary A-player will remain. Now consider the B-player. Note that if
mB(c, 1) ≤ 1 holds, the boundary B-player will switch to A with positive probability.
This translates into c ≤ α+β−1
2
. Thus, provided switching costs are low, the A-cluster
will grow contagiously, even in the absence of mistakes. If this condition is violated,
c > α+β−1
2
, the boundary B-player will stay a B-player with certainty. This, in
turn, implies that for sufficiently high switching costs non-monomorphic states are
absorbing.
Surprisingly, switching costs may not only alter the set of absorbing states but
may also change the set of LRE. To see this, first note that one can move among the
set of non-monomorphic states via a chain of single mutations. More precisely, it is
possible to move from a state in G` to either a state in Ga or in Gb, with a < ` < b at
the cost of one mutation. While, it is clear that one mutation to A (or B) increases
(decreases) the number of A-players by one, this initial mutation might also trigger
13
additional changes.
Further, note that in the presence of non-monomorphic states the transition from
one monomorphic state to the other can occur via a series of intermediate steps.
Which state will be LRE depends on how difficult it is to move from the two monomor-
phic states,
−→
A and
−→
B into the set of non-monomorphic states.8 First, consider states
where there is only one A-player.
. . . BBABB . . .
As the A-player has no A-neighbors she will switch to B with positive probability if
mA(c, 1) ≥ 0 which translates into c ≤ 1 − β. In this case lonesome A-players will
disappear. However, states with two adjacent A-players are absorbing. Conversely, if
c > 1−β holds, the A-player will keep her strategy and states with lonesome A-players
are absorbing. Likewise, consider the case when there is a lonesome B-player.
. . . AABAA . . .
The B-player has two A-neighbors and will switch strategies with positive probability
provided that mB(c, 1) ≤ 2, which can be rewritten as c ≤ α. However, whenever
c > α, a lonesome B-player will remain. Note, by risk dominance of A, α > 1 − β.
This implies that whenever lonesome B-players will keep their strategy, lonesome
A-player will do the same.
Summarizing, if c ≤ α+β−1
2
, only the monomorphic states are absorbing and A can
spread out contagiously. Thus,
−→
A is unique LRE. If α+β−1
2
< c ≤ α and c ≤ 1 − β,
non-monomorphic states are absorbing and it is possible to move among the non-
monomorphic states and from these states to the monomorphic ones via a single
mutation chain. It is further possible to move from the two monomorphic states to
the set of non-monomorphic states at the cost of two mutations. Thus, one can exhibit
8As the non-monomorphic states can be connected to each other and to the monomorphic states via a chain of single
mutations which tree will be of minimum cost will be determined by how difficult it is to escape the monomorphic
states. The next section elaborates on this in more detail.
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A- and B- trees which are of cost smaller than any AB-tree. Hence,
−→
A and
−→
B are
LRE. If, however, c > 1 − β, moving from −→A to the set of non-monomorphic states
takes two mutations, whereas escaping
−→
B is possible at the cost of one mutation.
Thus, in this case one can exhibit A-trees which are of minimum cost, implying that
−→
A is unique LRE. If c > α , all absorbing states are accessible from each other via a
chain of single mutations, implying that all of them are LRE.
Whether it is actually possible that a non-risk dominant convention is LRE does
not only depend on the level of switching costs but also on the parameters of the
underlying game. To see this point note that both monomorphic states are LRE if
c > α+β−1
2
and c ≤ 1 − β. It, thus, has to be the case that α+β−1
2
< 1 − β . This
translates into α + 3β < 3. This condition is fulfilled if the advantage of strategy
A over B is not too large, but per se is not related to payoff dominance or risk
dominance.9 Importantly, it may hold if α > 1. Thus, even if action A is risk-
and payoff- dominant, it might not be unique LRE. We illustrate the set of LRE
depending on the level of switching cost in this case in Figure 1. It is interesting
to note that the prediction is ”non-monotonic” in the level of switching costs. With
increasing switching costs the prediction switches from
−→
A to
−→
A ∪−→B back to −→A and
finally to
−→
A ∪ −→B ∪G in games with α + 3β < 3.
-
−→
A
−→
A
⋃−→
B
−→
A
−→
A
⋃−→
B
⋃
G
0 α+β−12 1− β α c
Figure 1: LRE under two player interaction with switching costs and α+ 3β < 3.
3.2 2k-neighbor interaction and global interactions
We will now generalize the insights of the two player interaction model to 2k-neighbor
interaction. We show that we can expect similar phenomena as in the simple two-
neighbor model for small interaction neighborhoods. However, as the the size of
the interaction neighborhood, k, increases switching costs do no longer influence the
9If strategy A is sufficiently advantageous compared to B, α+3β > 3, it will be uniquely selected up to the point
where c > α. (where all absorbing states are LRE.)
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prediction, with the exception of very high levels of switching costs, where in the
absence of noise no player would switch regardless of the distribution of strategies
in her neighborhood. The following lemma provides a characterization of the set of
absorbing states.
Lemma 1: For positive switching costs,c > 0,
i) there are no non-singleton absorbing sets.
ii) the only absorbing states are
−→
A ,
−→
B and G.
Proof: To prove the first part consider an absorbing set W . Consider a state s˜ ∈ W
where the number of A-players is maximal. Let m˜ be the number of A-players at this
state. It follows that at this state there does not exist a B-player who, when given
revision opportunity, switches to A with positive probability. Thus, mi < mB(c, k)
for all i with si = B. If it is the case that mj > mA(c, k) for all j with sj = A,
then s˜ is the only state in W . If mj ≤ mA(c, k) for some players j with sj = A,
we proceed in the following manner. With positive probability, one of these agents
receives revision opportunity and switches to B. We reach a new state s′. At this new
state there are strictly fewer A-players. Provided that c > 0 for the new B-player we
have mj ≤ mA(c, k) < mB(c, k), implying that she will not switch back. For all old
B-players it is still true that mi < mB(c, k), implying that none of them will switch.
If there is no A-player withmj ≥ mA(c, k) left, the state s′ is absorbing (contradicting
that s˜ ∈ W ). If there are still such A-players left, we iterate the procedure until we
reach an absorbing state, eventually contradicting the assumption s˜ ∈ W .
The second part follows from the definition of
−→
A ,
−→
B and G. 
With the help of this lemma we are able to provide the following result.10
Proposition 2: In the 2k-neighbor interaction model,
a) if c ≤ α+β−1
2
and N > k(k + 1), then S = {−→A},
10In the following we denote by bxc the largest integer not greater than x and by dxe the smallest integer not less
than x.
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b) if α+β−1
2
< c ≤ α and
i) if bmA(c, k)c = b2k −mB(c, k)c, then S = {−→A,−→B }
ii) if bmA(c, k)c < b2k −mB(c, k)c, then S = {−→A}, and
c) if c > α, then S = {−→A,−→B } ∪G.
Proof: For part a) note if c ≤ α+β−1
2
, one has mB(c, k) ≤ k, implying that a B-player
switches to A with positive probability whenever half (or more) of her 2k-neighbors
choose A. Thus, A may spread contagiously and we are back in the model outlined
by Ellison (1993), where S = {−→A} if N > k(k + 1). 11
We now consider the case where c > α+β−1
2
. Here we have mB(c, k) > k. Thus,
B-players will no longer switch if they have half of their neighbors playing A. This
implies A can no longer spread out contagiously. Further, non-monomorphic states
are now absorbing, meaning that the set G is non-empty.
We next show that it is possible to move from an absorbing state AB ∈ G` to
either a state in Ga or in Gb, with a < ` < b at the cost of one mutation. We will
show that there exists an A- (and a B-player) such that if she mutates to B (to
A), she will not switch back and no other player will switch to A (to B). By the
definition of G` we have mi > mA(c, k) for all i with si = A and mj < mB(c, k) for all
j with sj = B. Consider now an A-player i whose adjacent neighbor j is playing B.
As they are direct neighbors they have only one player who is not a joint neighbor.
Call i’s disjoint neighbor i˜ and j’s disjoint neighbor j˜. Further j also faces i who
is an A-player. It follows that j faces either the same number of A-neighbors as i
(if si˜ = A and sj˜ = B), has one more A-neighbors than i (if si˜ = sj˜), or two more
A-neighbors (if si˜ = B and sj˜ = A). Thus, mj ∈ {mi,mi + 1,mi + 2}. Assume that j
mutates to A. Since mj ≥ mi > mA(c, k) she will not switch back. Further, as there
are now more A-players, none of the old A-players will switch, showing that we will
reach a state Gb with b > `. An analogous argument can be used to show that it is
11Note that we have a model with positive inertia whereas Ellison’s model features strategy adjustment in each
round. See Weidenholzer (2010) for a discussion of the model with inertia.
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also possible with one mutation to move to a state Ga with a < `.
Now consider
−→
B . We want to find the minimum number of mutations required
for a transition from
−→
B to a state in the set G. Let C(
−→
B ,AB) denote this number.
Recall that mA(c, k) is defined such that if a player has strictly more than mA(c, k)
A-neighbors, she will strictly prefer to stay at A. If mA(c, k) < 0, we have that an
A-player remains even if she does not have an A neighbor. Thus, if mA(c, k) < 0, one
mutation is enough to move from
−→
B to a state in G1. Now consider mA(c, k) ≥ 0.
First, consider the case where mA(c, k) /∈ Z (where Z denotes the integers). In
this case, if dmA(c, k)e + 1 adjacent players mutate to A each of them will have
dmA(c, k)e > mA(c, k) players choosing B. Thus, none of them will switch and
we have reached an absorbing state in the set GdmA(c,k)e+1. Note that if less than
dmA(c, k)e+ 1 players switch to A, all of them will switch back when given revision
opportunity. It follows that C(
−→
B ,AB) = max{dmA(c, k)e, 0} + 1 for mA(c, k) /∈ Z.
Now consider mA(c, k) ∈ Z. In this case for all A players to stay with probability one
each of them needs strictly more than mA(c, k) A-neighbors. Thus, if mA(c, k) + 2
players switch to A, each of them will have mA(c, k) + 1 neighbors playing A and will
not switch back with positive probability. Thus, C(
−→
B ,AB) = max{mA(c, k)+1, 0}+1
for mA(c, k) ∈ Z. Summing up, we have
C(
−→
B ,AB) =
 max{dmA(c, k)e, 0}+ 1, if mA(c, k) /∈ Zmax{mA(c, k) + 1, 0}+ 1, if mA(c, k) ∈ Z .
This can be written as C(
−→
B ,AB) = max{bmA(c, k)c+ 1, 0}+ 1.
Conversely, consider the convention
−→
A . We aim to understand how many muta-
tions to B we need so that the new B-players will keep their strategy with certainty.
If mB(c, k) > 2k, this would be the case even if all neighbors choose A. Thus, one
mutation is enough to move from
−→
A to a state in GN−1 whenever mB(c, k) > 2k. As-
sume mB(c, k) ≤ 2k. Now a B-player will keep her strategy whenever mi < mB(c, k).
Initially the B-players had 2k A-neighbors. Thus, each of them needs strictly more
18
than 2k−mB(c, k) of their neighbors to play B to keep their strategy with probability
one. Again, let us distinguish the cases 2k − mB(c, k) ∈ Z and 2k − mB(c, k) /∈ Z
. In the latter case with d2k −mB(c, k)e + 1 mutations one can move from −→A to a
state in the set GN−d2k−mB(c,k)e−1. Thus, C(
−→
A,AB) = max{d2k −mB(c, k)e, 0}+ 1.
If 2k − mB(c, k) ∈ Z , we need 2k − mB(c, k) + 2 mutations to ensure that each
B player has more than 2k − mB(c, k) neighbors playing B. As above, the cases
2k − mB(c, k) ∈ Z and 2k − mB(c, k) /∈ Z can be unified by using C(−→A,AB) =
max{b2k −mB(c, k)c+ 1, 0}+ 1.
Finally, let us determine the set of LRE. Let L denote the number of non-
monomorphic absorbing states. Thus, together with the states
−→
A and
−→
B there
are L + 2 absorbing states. We can connect all L AB states to each other and
to
−→
A and
−→
B via a chain of single mutations. Further, we can move from
−→
B
into the class of AB states at the cost of C(
−→
B ,AB). Thus, we can exhibit min-
imum A-trees of cost L + C(
−→
B ,AB). Likewise, the minimum B-trees have cost
L+C(
−→
A,AB). Further, for each state AB ∈ G we can exhibit a minimum cost tree
of cost L− 1 + C(−→A,AB) + C(−→B ,AB).
First note that if c > α, we have mA(c, k) < 0 and mB(c, k) > 2k. It follows
C(
−→
A,AB) = C(
−→
B ,AB) = 1. Thus, the minimum cost
−→
A -, the
−→
B -, and all minimum
cost AB-trees have cost L+ 1. Thus, S = {−→A,−→B } ∪G.
Now, consider α+β−1
2
< c ≤ α . Observe that b2k − mB(c, k)c = b2k(1 −
2q∗) + mA(c, k)c ≥ bmA(c, k)c . Thus, C(−→A,AB) ≥ C(−→B ,AB). So, we either
have C(
−→
A,AB) > C(
−→
B ,AB) in which case S = −→A or C(−→A,AB) = C(−→B ,AB) in
which case S = −→A ∪ −→B . 
Thus, the presence of switching costs may imply that under local interactions the
risk dominant convention is no longer unique LRE. Let us provide some technical
intuition for this result. First, if c ≤ α+β−1
2
, the risk dominant strategy may still
spread contagiously and, thus, remains unique LRE. For α+β−1
2
< c ≤ α there exist
absorbing AB states. Whether the risk dominant or the payoff dominant convention is
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LRE boils down to the question from which of the two conventions it is more difficult
to move to the set of AB-states. This is measured by the numbers C(
−→
A,AB) and
C(
−→
B ,AB) which are in turn rounded down values of the functions 2k−mB(c, k) + 2
and mA(c, k) + 2. Risk dominance implies that C(
−→
B ,AB) ≤ C(−→A,AB). Thus,
the risk dominant convention is always contained in the set of LRE. The functions
2k−mB(c, k)+2 andmA(c, k)+2 only differ by a constant and are linearly decreasing
in the switching costs. It may very well be the case that the rounded down values
are the same, C(
−→
A,AB) = C(
−→
B ,AB). In this case both conventions turn out to be
LRE. Finally, for c > α we have that agents will not switch strategies, no matter
what the distribution of strategies among their neighbors is and all absorbing states
turn out to be LRE.
In Figure 2, we plot the transition costs from either convention to the set of non-
monomorphic states as a function of the switching costs. Whenever C(
−→
A,AB) lies
above C(
−→
B ,AB) the convention
−→
A is unique LRE. When C(
−→
A,AB) and C(
−→
B ,AB)
coincide both conventions,
−→
A and
−→
B , are LRE. When the two functions are equal
to one, both conventions,
−→
A and
−→
B , and the set of non-monomorphic states G are
LRE. Note that as in the two player interaction case the prediction is non-monotonic
in the level of switching costs. In particular, the prediction that the risk dominant
convention is unique LRE and the prediction that both of them are LRE alternate
k-times.
The following corollary explores the circumstances under which switching costs
may influence the set of LRE. In case switching cost may change the prediction, it
shows that the prediction will be non-monotonic as switching costs vary.
Corollary 3: If α+β−1
2
< c ≤ α and
a) if 2k(1− 2q∗) ≥ 1, then S = −→A
b) if 2k(1−2q∗) < 1, then there exist thresholds c¯k+1 < ck < c¯k < ck−1 < c¯k−1 < . . . <
c1 < c¯1 (with c¯k+1 = α+β−1
2
and c¯1 = α) such that if c ∈ (c¯`+1, c`] for ` = 1, 2, . . . , k,
then S = −→A ∪ −→B and S = −→A otherwise.
20
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4
c0
1
2
3
4
CHX ,GL
A AÜB A AÜB A AÜB A AÜBÜG
Figure 2: LRE in the game [α, β] = [1.1, 0.1] with interaction radius k = 3. The solid line plots
the transition costs C( ~A,AB) and the dashed line plots the transition costs C( ~B,AB). Whenever
C( ~A,AB) lies above C( ~B,AB) the convention ~A is unique LRE. When C( ~A,AB) and C( ~B,AB)
coincide both conventions, ~A and ~B, are LRE. When the two functions are equal to 1, both conven-
tions, ~A and ~B, and the set of non-monomorphic states G are LRE.
Proof: Consider case bii) in the previous Proposition. First, note that 2k−mB(c, k) =
mA(c, k) + 2k(1 − 2q∗). Thus, the functions mA(c, k) and 2k −mB(c, k) only differ
by the constant 2k(1− 2q∗). Risk dominance implies 2k(1− 2q∗) > 0. Further, note
that mA(c, k) (and thus also 2k −mB(c, k)) is linearly decreasing in c.
Consider part a). Note if 2k(1− 2q∗) ≥ 1, then b2k −mB(c, k)c > bmA(c, k)c .
Now consider part b). Let c` be the value of switching costs c that solvesmA(c, k)+
1 = `. Note that bmA(c, k) + 1c = ` for c`+1 < c ≤ c`. Likewise, define c¯` to be the
value of switching costs c for which 2k−mB(c, k) + 1 = `. We have b2k−mB(c, k) +
1c = ` for c¯`+1 < c ≤ c¯`.
As 2k−mB(c, k) = mA(c, k)+2k(1−2q∗) > mA(c, k) and mA(c, k) is decreasing in
c it follows that c` < c¯`. Further, note that for 2k(1− q∗) < 1 one has mA(c, k) + 1 <
mA(c, k) + 2k(1 − 2q∗) + 1 < mA(c, k) + 2. Thus, c` < c¯` < c`−1. The last two
observations imply c¯k+1 < ck < c¯k < ck−1 < c¯k−1 < . . . < c1 < c¯1. Now note that
bmA(c, k) + 1c = b2k−mB(c, k) + 1c = ` if c ∈ (c`+1, c`] and c ∈ (c¯`+1, c¯`]. This is the
case for c ∈ (c¯`+1, c`]. On the contrary, if c ∈ (c`, c¯`−1], then bmA(c, k) + 1c = `− 1 <
` = b2k −mB(c, k) + 1c. 
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The main idea behind this corollary is that the functions 2k −mB(c, k) + 2 and
mA(c, k) + 2 only differ by the constant 2k(1 − 2q∗). If this constant is greater
than or equal to one, we will have C(
−→
B ,AB) = bmA(c, k) + 2c < C(−→A,AB) =
b2k−mB(c, k) + 2c, regardless the level of switching costs. If, however, this constant
is smaller than one, there exist levels of switching costs for which b2k −mB(c, k)c =
bmA(c, k)c. Further, note that if there exists a range of switching costs for which,
e.g., b2k −mB(c, k)c = bmA(c, k)c = 1, then due to the stepwise nature of the floor
function, there also exists a range of switching costs for which b2k−mB(c, k) + 2c =
bmA(c, k) + 2c = r for every r ∈ Z. Thus, the prediction that the convention −→A is
unique LRE and the prediction that both conventions,
−→
A and
−→
B , are LRE alternate
k times as c increases (and C(
−→
B ,AB) and C(
−→
A,AB) decrease from k + 1 to 1).
Finally, it is interesting to note that since c1 = 1 − β and c¯1 = α, for c ∈ (1 − β, α]
one has S = −→A . Further, if c > α , one has S = {−→A,−→B } ∪G. Hence, just before the
model’s prediction includes all absorbing states it uniquely selects the risk dominant
convention.
A straightforward implication of the first part of the corollary is that if agents
interact with sufficiently many other agents (k large) or if the risk dominant action
has a relatively large basin of attraction (q small), switching costs do not influence the
prediction. The second part of the corollary implies that if agents interact only with
a few other agents (k small) and/or the risk dominant action’s basin of attraction is
relatively small (q close to 1
2
), then the prediction may not be unique and moreover
is non-monotonic in the level of switching costs.
Finally, note that it is possible to reconcile our findings with the results of Norman
(2009) by simply setting k = N−1
2
, thus, obtaining a model of global interactions. For
small populations switching costs may very well have an impact on the set of LRE.
However, in large populations, as considered by Norman (2009), the prediction is
robust to switching costs. In this case, switching costs speed up convergence but do
not alter the long run behavior of the population.
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4 Conclusion
We have established that under local interactions the set of LRE may be altered
by the presence of switching costs. In particular, the risk dominant convention may
no longer be unique LRE. If, however, agents interact with sufficiently many other
agents our critique does not apply and risk dominant conventions are still uniquely
selected.
One question that immediately comes to mind is whether our findings hold in a
more general context. In the context of this paper switching costs played the follow-
ing role: i) Under switching costs non-monomorphic states may become absorbing.
ii) Switching costs may change the transition costs, measured in the number of re-
quired mistakes, with which these non-monomorphic states can be accessed from the
monomorphic ones. Rounding up, when calculating switching costs, may lead to the
effects outlined in this paper. If the number of required mistakes is relatively small,
the effect of rounding up will be most pronounced. However, for a large number of
required mistakes these effects will be most likely negligible. We, thus, conjecture
that switching costs will play a similar role in models where only a relatively small
number of mutations is needed to move from one convention to another. There are
two natural dimensions along which our results might be generalized. First, we expect
switching costs to impact the long run prediction in the circular city model of local
interactions if we move beyond the class of 2×2-coordination games (as in e.g Ellison
2000, Alós-Ferrer and Weidenholzer (2005)). Secondly, switching costs will also influ-
ence the prediction in models where the way in which agents interact with each other
implies that only few mistakes are necessary to move among conventions. Examples
include the torus model outlined in Ellison (2000), multiple location models (as in
Anwar (2002), Ely (2002), Blume and Temzelides (2003), Shi (2014), Alós-Ferrer and
Kirchsteiger (2010)), network formation models under asynchronous adjustments of
links and actions (see Jackson and Watts (2002)) or under constrained interactions
(as in Staudigl and Weidenholzer (2014)).
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Admittedly, the integer problem that is driving our results is an artefact of the
uniform noise approach. While other learning models such as the logit dynamics as
advocated by e.g. Blume ((1993), (1995)) do not face this problem, their predictions
sometimes may depend on other specifics such as the timing of revision opportunities
or tie breaking assumptions (see Alós-Ferrer and Netzer (2014) for a discussion).12
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Schelling’s Model Revisited: From
Segregation to Integration
000
Abstract
Schelling (1969, 1971) presents a microeconomic model showing that the
individual preferences can drive an integrated city into a rather segregated
city, though no player prefers segregation. We study the impact of location
heterogeneity on neighborhood segregation in the one-dimensional Schelling
residential model. We model location heterogeneity by introducing an ad-
vantageous node, in which a player’s utility is impartial to the composition
of her neighborhood. When every player interacts with two neighbors, we
find that one advantageous node in the circular city will lead to a result
that segregation is no longer the unique Long-run Equilibria. When play-
ers interact with more neighbors, more advantageous nodes are necessary
to obtain the same result.
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1 Introduction
Residential segregation — the concentration of ethnic, or socioeconomic groups in
particular neighborhoods of a city or metropolitan area — is widely perceived as
the antithesis of successful integration. This phenomenon is associated with negative
outcomes for minorities in terms of academic performance, education attainment,
employment and criminal behaviors.13
The emergence and persistence of residential segregation may be the result of many
factors: economic differences between racial and ethnic groups, housing affordability,
different preferences for neighborhood composition, the nature of the urban structure
(including job location), and public and private discrimination. Thomas Schelling
(1969, 1971a, 1971b, 1978) introduces a model of residential segregation, in which he
explores the link between individual preferences and residential segregation. In his
model, a player’s utility entirely depends on the composition of her neighborhood.
Every player is assumed to be satisfied if no more than half of her neighbors are of the
opposite type. Unsatisfied players occasionally receive the opportunity to revise their
location and move to a satisfactory position. Using an inductive approach, Schelling
demonstrates that equilibrium configuration shows high levels of segregation. This
result has shown to be robust even if every player prefers integrated neighborhoods
(Zhang 2004b; Pancs and Vriend 2007). Young (1998) analytically studies Schelling’s
model employing the techniques of evolutionary game theory, and proved that the
segregated states are the only long-run outcome of a perturbed myopic best-response
dynamics.
The present paper aims to understand the role of location heterogeneity in neigh-
borhood segregation. We study a model akin to the one proposed by Young (1998),
where players of two types are located in a circular city, each of them interacts with
13See Coleman (1966), Bankston and Caldas (1996), Charles and Dinwiddie (2004) and Massey and Fischer (2006)
for the influence of residential segregation on academic performance. See Mayer (2002) and Massey and Denton (1993)
for the influence of residential segregation on education attainment. See Jencks and Mayer (1990) and Cutler and
Glaeser (1997) for the influence of residential segregation on employment. See Shihadeh and Flynn (1996), Collins
and Williams (1999) and Krivo and Peterson (1996) for the influence of residential segregation on criminal behaviors.
See also Wilson (2012) for other outcomes that result from residential segregation.
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two immediate neighbors. We model location heterogeneity by introducing an advan-
tageous node to the city. Player in the advantageous node is satisfied regardless of
her neighborhood. The rest players are satisfied if at least one of their neighbors is of
own type, and are unsatisfied otherwise. We motivate our study of location hetero-
geneity by the fact that dwelling units are differentiated in a multitude of dimensions,
including their own quality, such as size, age, type, as well as neighborhood effect.
An advantageous node represents a dwelling unit which is superior in its own quality,
so that people who live in it will ignore the potential disadvantage of neighborhood
effect.
The key feature of the advantageous node is that a player residing there is impartial
to the composition of her neighborhood. With this advantageous node, one can stay in
a neighborhood without neighbors of her own type. This will create an intermediate
state, which allow the transitions from segregated states to non-segregated states
can be induced via step-by-step evolution as outlined in Ellison (2000). We find that
when there is one advantageous node in the city, the long-run prediction of the model
will include more integrated neighborhood. Furthermore, when each player interacts
with more neighbors on her both sides, the transition from segregated states to non-
segregated states requires more mistakes at once, which implies that a cluster of
advantageous nodes is necessary to bridge the gap.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The related previous litera-
ture will be reviewed in the next section. Section 3 presents the model and discusses
the main techniques used. Section 4 presents the main result when players interact
with two neighbors. Section 5 extends the model to the case where players interact
with more neighbors. Section 6 uses agent-based simulations to assess the quantita-
tive implication of our model. Section 7 concludes.
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2 Literature review
Although documented earlier in a literature in sociology (Duncan and Duncan 1957
and Taeuber and Taeuber 1965), it is since Schelling publishes a series of papers
(Schelling 1969, 1971a, 1971b, 1972) and the book Micromotives and Macrobehav-
ior (1978) that the causes and mechanism of residential segregation have been dis-
cussed in an analytical framework. Schelling first presents a one-dimensional model
(Schelling (1969)). In this model, players of two types (O and X) are distributed
along a linear city, and have the four players on their either side as their neighbor-
hood. Each player can choose his location, and aims to avoid being a minority in
his neighborhood. If a player is in the minority, he will insert himself into a satisfied
position when given opportunity of revision. Driven by this micromotive, the linear
city will unravel into a highly segregated state, even though no individual prefers seg-
regation to integration. In his subsequent works, Schelling considers variations of this
model. Schelling (1971a, 1971b) presents a two-dimensional version, where players
live on a checkerboard, and some of the cells in the checkerboard are left unoccupied.
In this checkerboard model, a player’s neighborhood is defined as the eight players
around him, which is the so-called Moore neighborhood. An unsatisfied player, who
is in the minority in his neighborhood, will move to a vacant cell with satisfactory
neighborhood provided it exists, when given opportunity to revise. Schelling (1971b,
1978) also considers different discriminatory preferences, in which the players’ toler-
ance threshold for neighbors of the opposite type increases to 2/3, and the society
starts with a perfectly integrated board. With all these variations, the city with two
types of players inevitably reaches a highly segregated state. In all these residential
segregation models, Schelling focuses on individual preferences, which give impetus
to segregation at a global level, even though no individual agent strictly prefers this.
Later the model is tested empirically, mostly by sociologists and geographers. In
a seminal contribution in geography, Clark (1991) tests Schelling’s model with the
data from surveys of residential preferences. He finds support for it, although the
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preference schedules derived from surveys have a different form from Schelling’s as-
sumption. Cutler, Glaeser and Vigdor (1997) examine segregation in American cities
from 1890 to 1990. By comparing inter-generational segregation status in different
ethnic minorities, the paper finds that decentralized racism is the main contributing
factor to segregation since late 20th century. Farley, Fielding and Krysian (1997) ex-
amine the preference hypothesis to segregation by using interview data from four US
cities, and find that the whites’ willingness to move into a neighborhood is inversely
related to the density of blacks living there, and the blacks prefer integrated neigh-
borhoods. Thus, the tolerance of blacks for living with white neighbors is crucial to
whether integration is likely.
Young (1998) was the first to solve Schelling’s model analytically, adopting the
techniques developed in evolutionary game theory. In this book, he presented a
simple segregation model, where players of two types distribute on a one-dimensional
circle, and proved that segregated states are the unique stochastically stable states in
the model, even through a segregated neighborhood is not strictly preferred. Zhang
(2004b) extends Young’s (1998) result to a two-dimensional case, and formulates
neighborhood transition as a spatial game played on a lattice graph. In this paper,
preferences for neighborhood composition are represented by payoff functions, which
peaks at a perfectly integrated neighborhood and is asymmetric—agents prefer being
in the majority over being in the minority. He shows that even if everybody prefers
balanced neighborhoods, the segregational pattern emerges and persists regardless
of the initial state. Zhang (2004a) enriches the two-dimensional model by adding
a simple housing market. This model shows that a slight asymmetry in residential
preferences between the two groups still induces endogenous segregation.
Schelling’s model was also one of the earliest examples of what today would be
called an agent-based model. Epstein and Axtell (1996) demonstrate that Schelling’s
initial result holds under a wide variety of conditions. Bruch and Mare (2006) indicate
that very high segregation occurs only when individual behavior is governed by strict
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thresholds. When the preference function is continuous, segregation is less likely
comparing to a step preference function. Benard and Willer (2007) extend Schelling’s
model to incorporate the wealth and status of agents and desirability and affordability
of residences. Given the effect of status-wealth correlation and a housing market,
they find that the greater the status-wealth correlation, the more the agents tend to
segregate. Laurie and Jaggi (2003) argue that when individuals are able to observe the
neighborhood structure of a wider area, integrated neighborhood may become stable.
However, Fossett and Warren (2005) argue that Laurie and Jaggi’s (2003) result are
driven by the assumption of their model. In Laurie and Jaggi’s (2003) model, agents
move only when they can improve their utility, and will stay in their slot forever
when satisfied. This differs significantly from real residential systems which have
continuous residential turnover and movement resulting from demographic processes
of migration and household lifecycle dynamics. This implausible assumption prevents
segregation taking place in the model.
Pancs and Vriend (2007) consider a variety of network structures, (one- and two-
dimensions; checkerboard and torus), and find that segregation is the only long-
run outcome under all the specifications, even if individuals strictly prefer perfect
integration. However, Pancs and Vriend (2007) present the result analytically on a
ring only. They argue that the mechanisms of best-response dynamics are different in
one- and two-dimensional models. Although they do not extend their analytical result
to two-dimensional context, they obtained results in line with the one-dimensional
model by using agent-based simulations in a two-dimensional space. O’Sullivan (2009)
presents a model with heterogeneity among the agents. He finds that if there are some
agents who are indifferent about their neighborhood compositions, segregation in the
city will decrease and the overall utility of the agents will increase.
Our research is based on Young’s (1998) one-dimensional model, by adopting the
same assumption and techniques as Young (1998), we introduce location heterogene-
ity in the model, and find that segregation is no longer the unique long-run equilib-
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rium in the model, which could provide a better understanding on the mechanism of
Schelling’s segregation model.
3 The model
3.1 Basic Setup
We start with a one-dimensional residential model following Young (1998). We con-
sider a society of 2n players, who lives in a ring network represented by a 2n-node
cycle. Each individual occupies a node, so there is no vacant node in the city. The
type (T ) of a player is either A or B. We assume that each type has the same pop-
ulation size. We define the neighborhood of a player as her k nearest neighbors who
live on her left and right sides, i.e. the neighborhood of a player who lives in node
i consists of the players at nodes N(i) ={i − k, i − k + 1, . . . , i − 1, i + 1, . . . , i + k}
(modulo 2n). We further assume that 2n > 2k+ 1, so we can rule out the case where
some player is counted in the neighborhood of another player multiple times.
We assume that a player’s utility depends on the composition of her neighborhood
and the node she lives in, she is either satisfied or unsatisfied with her position. As
a variation of the standard Schelling’s model, we introduce an advantageous node to
the city. If a player is in the advantageous node, she will be satisfied regardless of
her neighborhood. When a player lives in a normal node, we assume that her utility
depends on the composition of her neighborhood. Following Schelling (1969), we
assume a player is satisfied if at least half of her neighbors are of the same type, and
unsatisfied otherwise.
We define a cluster as a set of adjacent players of the same type. We denote a
cluster by its relative position to the advantageous node. The cluster containing the
advantageous node is cluster 1. Cluster l + 1 is the lth cluster to the right of cluster
1. Let z denote a state of the city, which specifies how the 2n players are arranged in
the circular city. We denote by Z the set of the states. We denote by ml the size of
cluster l. We denote by T ∗ the player of type T , who is located in the advantageous
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node. Consider a state z ∈ Z, in which the players are arranged as:
z = A
...A∗ . . . A︸ ︷︷ ︸
m1
B . . . B︸ ︷︷ ︸
m2
A . . . A︸ ︷︷ ︸
m3
B . . . B︸ ︷︷ ︸
m4
. . . B . . . B︸ ︷︷ ︸
mM
A
...A∗ . . . A︸ ︷︷ ︸
m1
,
where the vertical dashed line indicates the position of the advantageous node, where
the city joins. We denote by m(z) = (m1,m2, . . .mM−1,mM), the distribution of the
players in state z, where we denote by M the number of clusters in the city.
Different from the original Schelling’s model, we have an advantageous node in the
city. Every node can be defined according to its relative position to this absolute
node. Consider two states z and z′, every player in z and z′ has the same relative
position to other players, but has a different relative position to the advantageous
node. In Schelling’s original model, where the position of a player is only defined by
her relative position to her neighbors, z and z′ are exactly the same states. However,
these two states are different states in our model.
3.2 The dynamic process
At each round, one pair of players is chosen uniformly at random and exchanges
their location if the swap can increase the aggregate utility of the chosen players.
Apparently, there can be positive gain from the swap only if the two chosen players
are of different types. If two players of the same type exchange, both of them will
not change their utility before and after the swap, and there will be no gain from the
swap. There are two possible cases when the swap takes place with positive gain:
i) one player is unsatisfied and the other is satisfied before the swap, and both are
satisfied afterward, or ii) both players are unsatisfied before the swap and both are
satisfied afterward. Since we assume that a player is either satisfied or unsatisfied
with her position, a swap with positive gain is always Pareto-improving.
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3.3 Review of techniques
The city evolves by making swaps with positive gain. In addition, we assume that
with fixed probability  > 0, independent across players and across time, a pair of
players ignores their prescription and makes a swap with no positive gain in aggregate
utility, i.e. they make a mistake or mutate.
Definition 1: A state z is absorbing if no alternative state z′ can be reached from z
without mutations. We denote by Z the set of absorbing states.
The process with mistakes is called perturbed process . Under mistakes, the process
is irreducible for any two states can be reached from each other. We denote the
unique invariant distribution of this process by µ(). As the rate of experimentation
converges to 0, the limit invariant distribution limε→0 µ() = µ∗ predicts the process
in the long run. The states in the support of µ∗ are called Long Run Equilibria
or stochastically stable states. We use a characterization of the set of LRE due to
Freidlin and Wentzell (1988). For each absorbing state z, a z-tree is a set of directed
edges such that, from every absorbing state different from z, there is unique directed
path in the tree to z. For each edge, the minimal number of mutations that needed for
evolving from one absorbing state to another is called transition cost. The resistance
of the z-tree is the sum of the transition cost on the edges that compose it. When
the probability of error converges to 0, the perturbed process is most likely to follow
the paths that lead to the states with least resistance.
Lemma 1: (Freidlin and Wentzell 1988): The LRE of the process is the set of states
which have z-trees with the least resistance.
We will also make use of the concept of a mutation-connected component, which
will simplify the analysis of the where a class of absorbing states can be reached from
each other via a series of single mutations.
Definition 2: A set of absorbing states Z0 is a mutation-connected component if for
any z, z′ ∈ Z0, it is possible to go from z to z′ through a sequence of single mutation
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transitions.
Lemma 2: (Nöldeke and Samuelson 1993, Proposition 1): If one state in the
mutation-connected component is LRE, so are the states in the same mutation-
connected component.
4 Location heterogeneity in the two-neighbor residential model
In this part, we will characterize all the absorbing states in a two-neighbor model
with one advantageous node, and identify the LRE of the model. In the next section,
we will generalize the model to the case where k > 1.
First, we characterize the absorbing states in the model. In our model, a player is
satisfied in two cases: i) she lives in a normal node and one of her neighbors is of her
own type; ii) she lives in the advantageous node. When a player in a normal node
has no neighbor of her own type, she is unsatisfied. We refer to such player as the
isolated player .
Lemma 3: In the two-neighbor residential model with one advantageous node, the
absorbing states of the unperturbed process are the states where there is no isolated
player in the normal node. So, the set of absorbing states (Z0) is:
Z0 = {z|m1(z) > 1, mi(z) > 2, i = 2, 3, 4 . . .M}, where M ∈ {2, . . . , 2
⌊
n
2
⌋}.
Proof: i) Consider a state z ∈ Z0, in which no player in the normal node is isolated.
In this case, every player in the normal nodes has at least one neighbor of the same
type, and the player in the advantageous node is satisfied anyway. Thus, every player
in the city is satisfied and the state is absorbing.
ii) Consider a state z′ /∈ Z0, where there exists at least one isolated player in a
normal node. Without loss of generality, we assume the isolated player is an A-player,
z′ = A . . . A
...A∗A . . . A︸ ︷︷ ︸
m1
. . . B . . . B︸ ︷︷ ︸
mi
A︸︷︷︸
1
B . . .B︸ ︷︷ ︸
mi+2
A . . . A︸ ︷︷ ︸
mi+3
. . . B . . . B︸ ︷︷ ︸
mM
A . . . A
...A∗A . . . A︸ ︷︷ ︸
m1
.
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When she is selected, she can exchange her location with a B-player on the border
of a B-cluster. These two players are indicated in bold. Since both players involved
are satisfied after the swap, they will change the location with probability one. The
city will reach a state z′′ where no player in the normal nodes is isolated.
z′′ = A . . . A
...A∗A . . . A︸ ︷︷ ︸
m1
. . . B . . .B . . . B︸ ︷︷ ︸
mi+mi+2
AA . . . A︸ ︷︷ ︸
mi+3+1
. . . B . . . B︸ ︷︷ ︸
mM
A . . . A
...A∗A . . . A︸ ︷︷ ︸
m1
.
Thus, for any state, when there exists at least one isolated player in the normal
node, the state is not absorbing, and will reach an absorbing state with positive
probability. 
Now, we categorize the set of absorbing states into subsets based on the number
of clusters in the state. We denote by Z0(M) the set of absorbing states with M
clusters. Next, we give the definition of the segregated states.
Definition 3: A segregated state, is a state in which there are only two clusters in
the city, one of which consists of all the A-players and the other one consists of all
the B-players, i.e. M = 2.
Thus, the set of segregated states is given by Z0(2). Correspondingly, in a state, if
there are more than two clusters in the city, we call the state a non-segregated state.
Before we move to the main result, we present a series of lemmas that show how
the city can move among various absorbing states.
In the following lemma, we consider the transitions among the absorbing states
with the same number of clusters:
Lemma 4: When M < n, the absorbing states in Z0(M) compose a mutation-
connected component.
Proof: Consider an absorbing state z ∈ Z0(M), where M < n. Without loss of
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generality, we assume that an A-player occupies the advantageous node, so we have:
z = A . . . A
...A∗A . . . A︸ ︷︷ ︸
m1
B . . . B︸ ︷︷ ︸
m2
. . . B . . . B︸ ︷︷ ︸
mM
A . . . A
...A∗A . . . A︸ ︷︷ ︸
m1
.
SinceM < n, there exist one B-cluster and one A-cluster, each of them has more than
two players. Here we assume that mAi > 3, where i ∈ {1, 3, . . . ,M − 1}. Consider
two adjacent A-clusters, cluster i and cluster (i + 2). The city can evolve from an
absorbing state z, where m(z) = (m1,m2, . . . ,mi,mi+1,mi+2, . . . ,mM−1,mM),
z = A . . . A
...A∗A . . . A︸ ︷︷ ︸
m1
B . . . B︸ ︷︷ ︸
m2
. . . A . . . AA︸ ︷︷ ︸
mi
B . . . BB︸ ︷︷ ︸
mi+1
A . . . A︸ ︷︷ ︸
mi+2
. . . A . . . A
...A∗A . . . A︸ ︷︷ ︸
m1
to another absorbing state z′, where m(z′) = (m1,m2, . . . , (mi − 1),mi+1, (mi+2 +
1), . . . ,mM−1,mM),
z′ = A . . . A
...A∗A . . . A︸ ︷︷ ︸
m1
B . . . B︸ ︷︷ ︸
m2
. . . A . . . A︸ ︷︷ ︸
mi−1
BB . . . B︸ ︷︷ ︸
mi+1
AA . . . A︸ ︷︷ ︸
mi+2+1
. . . A . . . A
...A∗A . . . A︸ ︷︷ ︸
m1
with one mutation. By swaps like this, we can rearrange the distribution of A-players
among any two adjacent A-clusters. Iterating these single mutations, we can change
the distribution of all the A-players among these M/2 A-clusters, without affecting
the distribution of B-players. Due to symmetry of the types, we can also change the
distribution of all the B-players among these M/2 B-clusters.
Thus, when M < n, all the absorbing states with M cluster are connected via
single mutations. 
By Lemma 4, whenM < n, every absorbing state with the same number of clusters
can reach each other via single mutations. This implies that, if an absorbing state
z ∈ Z0(M) can reach an absorbing state z′ via single mutations, every absorbing
state in Z0(M) can reach z′ via single mutations; if an absorbing state z′ can reach
an absorbing state z ∈ Z0(M) via single mutations, z′ can reach every absorbing
state in Z0(M) via single mutations.
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In the following lemma, we consider the transition from the absorbing states with
more clusters to an absorbing state with fewer clusters:
Lemma 5: It is possible to move from an absorbing state in Z0(M) to an absorbing
state in Z0(M − 2) via a series of single mutations.
Proof: Consider an absorbing state z ∈ Z0(M)
z = A . . . A
...A∗A . . . A︸ ︷︷ ︸
m1
B . . . B︸ ︷︷ ︸
m2
. . . B . . . B︸ ︷︷ ︸
mi−1
AA︸︷︷︸
2
B . . . B︸ ︷︷ ︸
mi+1
. . . B . . . BB︸ ︷︷ ︸
mj
A . . . A︸ ︷︷ ︸
mj+1
. . . A . . . A
...A∗A . . . A︸ ︷︷ ︸
m1
,
in which one of the clusters in normal nodes has only two players. Without loss of
generality, let mi = 2. When one of the two players in cluster i and a B-player on
the border of a B-cluster are selected and swap by mistake, we will reach a state z′,
z′ = A . . . A
...A∗A . . . A︸ ︷︷ ︸
m1
B . . . B︸ ︷︷ ︸
m2
. . . B . . . B︸ ︷︷ ︸
mi−1
A︸︷︷︸
1
BB . . . B︸ ︷︷ ︸
mi+1+1
. . . B . . . B︸ ︷︷ ︸
mj−1
AA . . . A︸ ︷︷ ︸
mj+1+1
. . . A . . . A
...A∗A . . . A︸ ︷︷ ︸
m1
,
in which cluster i has only one A-player, who is isolated and unsatisfied. The state
z′ now lies in the basin of attraction of another absorbing state. When given oppor-
tunity, the isolated A-player could be selected and swap with another B-player with
positive probability and reach an absorbing state z′′ ∈ Z0(M − 2)
z′′ = A . . . A
...A∗A . . . A︸ ︷︷ ︸
m1
B . . . B︸ ︷︷ ︸
m2
. . . B . . . B︸ ︷︷ ︸
mi−1+mi+1+1
. . . A . . . A
...A∗A . . . A︸ ︷︷ ︸
m1
.
After these two swaps, cluster i has been eliminated, cluster (i − 1) and cluster
(i+ 1) merge into one B-cluster. Therefore, it is possible to move from an absorbing
state in Z0(M) to an absorbing state in Z0(M − 2) via a series of single mutations.

In the following lemma, we consider the transition from the absorbing states with
fewer clusters to an absorbing state with more clusters with the help of the advanta-
geous node.
Lemma 6: When M 6 n − 3, it is possible to move from the absorbing states in
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Z0(M) to the absorbing states in Z0(M + 2) via a series of single mutations.
Proof: When M = n−3, in an absorbing state with M clusters, the largest possible
cluster can have five players. We consider the set of absorbing states Z0(M), where
M 6 n− 3. In Z0(M), there exists an absorbing state z, such that (1) the advanta-
geous node is occupied by an A-player, (2) at least two A-neighbors on the left hand
side of the advantageous node and (3) at least two A-neighbors on the right hand
side of the advantageous node. It implies that cluster 1 has at least five players. The
state z is given by
z = A . . . A
...A∗A . . . A︸ ︷︷ ︸
m1
B . . . B︸ ︷︷ ︸
m2
. . . B . . . BB︸ ︷︷ ︸
mi
A . . . A︸ ︷︷ ︸
mi+1
. . . B . . . B︸ ︷︷ ︸
mM
A . . . A
...A∗A . . . A︸ ︷︷ ︸
m1
.
Since M 6 n − 3, there exists a B-cluster i in z, such that mi > 3. In the first
step, the A∗-player and a B-player on the border of cluster i are selected and swap
by mistake, a new absorbing state z′ is obtained,
z′ = A . . . A
...B∗A . . . A︸ ︷︷ ︸
m1
B . . . B︸ ︷︷ ︸
m2
. . . B . . . B︸ ︷︷ ︸
mi−1
AA . . . A︸ ︷︷ ︸
mi+1+1
. . . B . . . B︸ ︷︷ ︸
mM
A . . . A
...A∗A . . . A︸ ︷︷ ︸
m1
.
In the second step, an A-player next to the B∗-player and a B-player on the border
of the adjacent B-cluster could be selected and swap by mistake. We will reach an
absorbing state with (M + 2) clusters.
z′′ = A . . . A︸ ︷︷ ︸
mt
...B∗B︸︷︷︸
2
A . . .A︸ ︷︷ ︸
m1−mt−1
B . . . B︸ ︷︷ ︸
m2−1
. . . B . . . B︸ ︷︷ ︸
mM
A . . . A︸ ︷︷ ︸
mt
...B∗B︸︷︷︸
2
.
After these two swaps, we reach a new absorbing state z′′ ∈ Z0(M + 2), where a new
cluster 1 with two B-players is created and the original cluster 1 is separated into
two parts: cluster 2 and cluster M + 2. Therefore, when M 6 n − 3, the city can
evolve from absorbing states in Z0(M) to absorbing states in Z0(M + 2) via a series
of single mutations. 
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Note that in the absorbing state z′ in the proof of Lemma 6, the B∗-player has
no neighbor of her own type, she is satisfied due to the presence of the advantageous
node. If a state is not absorbing when the nodes in the city are homogeneous, and
become absorbing only after the advantageous node is introduced, we refer to such
state as the intermediate absorbing state. With the help of the advantageous node, the
intermediate absorbing states are created, so that the transitions from the absorbing
states with fewer clusters to an absorbing state with more clusters can be induced
via single mutations.
In the following proposition, we will identify the LRE of the model.
Proposition 1: When n is odd, the set of LRE is Z0, when n is even, the set of
LRE is Z0/Z0(n).14
Proof: i) When i is even, there can be at most n clusters in an absorbing state,
the set of absorbing states with n clusters is Z0(n). We know by Lemma 6 that,
when M 6 n− 3, the transition from the absorbing states with fewer clusters to an
absorbing state with more clusters be induced via single mutations. However, in an
absorbing state in Z0(n− 2), the largest possible cluster can have four players, it is
not possible to reach the absorbing states in Z0(n) via single mutations. By Lemma
5 and Lemma 6, the absorbing states in Z0/Z0(n) can reach each other via single
mutations, but cannot reach the absorbing states in Z0(n) via single mutations. So
we find that: i) for every absorbing state in Z0(n), every z-tree has at least one edge
with a resistance of two; ii) for every absorbing state in Z0/Z0(n), there exists a
z-tree in which every edge has a resistance exactly equal to one. Let L denote the
total number of absorbing states in the model. All the absorbing states in Z0/Z0(n)
can form a mutation-connected component, in which every state has a z-tree with the
least resistance of L− 1, the absorbing states in Z0(n) have z-tree with a resistance
no less than L. By Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, the set of LRE is Z0/Z0(n).
14We denote by A/B the set of all elements that are members of A but not members of B.
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ii) When n is odd, there can be at most (n− 1) clusters in an absorbing state. A
state in Z0(n − 3) can have a cluster with five players, by Lemma 6, We know that
the absorbing states in Z0(n− 3) can reach a state in Z0(n− 1) via single mutations.
In this case, we know by Lemma 5 and Lemma 6 that all the absorbing states in
Z0 form a mutation-connected component. Thus, all the absorbing states can be
connected with single mutations. By Lemma 2, we can conclude that when n is odd,
the set of LRE is Z0. 
In Lemma 4, 5 and 6, we explore how the city evolves among the absorbing states
via single mutations. By Lemma 4, we know that absorbing states with the same
number of clusters can reach each other via single mutations. By Lemma 5, we can
reach from the absorbing states with more clusters to the absorbing states with fewer
clusters via single mutations. Without the advantageous node, the transition from
the absorbing states with fewer clusters to the absorbing states with more clusters
requires at least two mistakes at once. This makes the absorbing states with fewer
clusters are easier to reach than to leave. Thus, in Schelling’s original model, the
absorbing states with fewest clusters — the segregated states — will be the unique
LRE. However, once the advantageous node is introduced to the city, the intermediate
states are created. By Lemma 6, an absorbing state with fewer clusters can reach an
intermediate state, then to an absorbing state with more clusters via single mutations.
By Lemma 4, 5, and 6, we find that given the number of clusters is not too large, the
states with different number of clusters can reach each other via single mutations. The
segregated states are not the unique LRE in the model with advantageous node. In
Proposition 1, we find that when n is even, the set of LRE includes all the absorbing
state in Z0/Z0(n). The states in Z0(n) have too many clusters, so that transition
from Z0(n− 2) to Z0(n) cannot be induced via single mutations by Lemma 6. When
n is odd, all the absorbing states are included in the set of LRE.
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5 Location heterogeneity in the 2k-neighbor residential model
5.1 The 2k-neighbor model without advantageous node
Next we consider the 2k-neighbor model. First we assume that 2n > 2k + 1, for
any k > 1 to rule out the case where some player is counted in the neighborhood of
another player multiple times. In the two-neighbor model, we assume that a player
will be satisfied if she is in the majority of her neighborhood, or she is located in an
advantageous node. In the 2k-neighbor case, a player in normal node interacts with
2k players on her both sides, she will be satisfied if at least k of them are of her own
type, and will be unsatisfied otherwise.
In the rest of the section, we first consider the case where all nodes in the circular
city are normal nodes, we identify the absorbing states and LRE in this case. Then,
we introduce the advantageous nodes to the city, and discuss the implication of the
heterogeneity among locations.
The following lemma characterizes the set of absorbing states in the 2k-neighbor
model when the nodes in the city are homogeneous.
Lemma 7: When the nodes in the city are homogenous, the absorbing states of the
2k-neighbor model can be categorized into the following two types:
(1) The states in which every cluster has no fewer than (k + 1) players;
(2) The states in which every cluster has m players, where m < k + 1, and k = 2pm
or k = (2p+ 1)m− 1, p = 1, 2, 3 . . . , for any k < 2n−1
2
.
Proof: For type (1), consider a cluster with no fewer than (k + 1) players of type
T ∈ {A,B}. Each player in the cluster has at least k neighbors of the same type
within the cluster, so every player in the cluster is satisfied. If every cluster in a state
has no fewer than (k+ 1) players, all players are satisfied, and the state is absorbing.
For type (2), when each cluster has exactly m players, and k = 2pm or k =
(2p + 1)m − 1, each player has exactly k neighbors of own type, so the states are
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absorbing.
Next, we show that if in a state, not all of the clusters have fewer than (k + 1)
players, the state is not absorbing, and will reach an absorbing state with positive
probability. Consider a state z, such that at least one of the clusters in z has fewer
than (k + 1) players, and at least one of the clusters in z has no fewer than (k + 1)
players. There exist two adjacent clusters in z, one has fewer than (k + 1) players,
and one has no fewer than (k + 1) players. Without loss of generality, we assume
the A-cluster (cluster i) has fewer than (k + 1) players, and its adjacent B-cluster
(cluster (i− 1)) has no fewer than (k + 1) players, i.e. mi−1 > k + 1, mi < k + 1
z = A . . . A
...A∗A . . . A︸ ︷︷ ︸
m1
B . . . B︸ ︷︷ ︸
m2
. . . B . . . B︸ ︷︷ ︸
mi−1
AA . . . A︸ ︷︷ ︸
mi
. . . B . . . B︸ ︷︷ ︸
mM
A . . . A
...A∗A . . . A︸ ︷︷ ︸
m1
.
Consider the A-player (indicated in bold) on the border of the cluster i. She has k B-
players on the left hand side of her neighborhood, and she will be satisfied only if rest
of her neighbors are A-players. Since this cluster i has fewer than (k + 1) A-players,
this emboldened A-player is unsatisfied, and will change her location with positive
probability. After the emboldened A-player change her location with other B-player,
the rest A-player in cluster i will be unsatisfied, and will also change their locations
successively. Iterating this process, every cluster which has fewer than (k+ 1) player
will be eliminated. Thus, the state z will reach an absorbing state of type (1) with
positive probability.
Then, we show that if in a state, every cluster has fewer than (k+ 1) players, but
not every cluster has the same number of players, the state is not absorbing, and will
reach an absorbing state with positive probability. We consider the following three
cases. Consider a state z′, in which every cluster has fewer than (k + 1) players. Let
cluster ` be the largest cluster in z, and there exists at least one cluster has strictly
fewer players than cluster `.
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i) First, we show that, if every cluster in a state has fewer than (k + 1) players, it
is absorbing only if every player on the border of a cluster has exactly k neighbors of
own type. Consider two adjacent clusters, one is an A-cluster, the other is a B-cluster.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the A-player next to the B-cluster – we
call her player i – has no fewer than (k+1) A-neighbors. The B-player next to player
i – we call her player j – has (2k − 2) joint neighbors with player i. Each of the two
players has an disjoint neighbor. Since player i has no fewer than (k+1) A-neighbors,
there are at least (k+ 1) A-players among the (2k− 2) joint neighbors and player i’s
disjoint neighbor. Thus, there are at least k A-players in the (2k−2) joint neighbors.
Now we consider the player j’s neighborhood. There are at least k A-players in
the joint neighbors, and player i is also an A-player in player j’s neighborhood. In
this case, player j has at least (k + 1) A-players in her neighborhood. Player j is
unsatisfied, and will change her location with positive probability. Once this B-player
change her location, the rest B-players in the B-cluster will also change their location
successively. The state will reach an absorbing state with positive probability. From
this, we know that if every cluster in a state has fewer than (k + 1) players, and one
of the player on the border of a cluster has no fewer than (k + 1) neighbors of own
type, the state is not absorbing.
ii) Next, we show that, if every player on the border of a cluster has exactly k
neighbors of her own type, and one cluster is strictly larger than some other cluster,
the state is not absorbing. We know that every player on the border of a cluster has
exactly k neighbors of her own type, and the neighborhood size of every player is
the same. Since cluster ` is the largest cluster, players in cluster (` + 1) and cluster
(`−1) have fewer than k neighbors of their own type. These players will change their
locations when given revision opportunity. We will obtain an absorbing state with
positive probability.
Thus, when every cluster has fewer than (k+ 1) players, but not every cluster has
the same number of players, the state is not absorbing.
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To sum up, the states of type (1) and type (2) are the absorbing states. A state
different from type (1) and type (2) are not absorbing, and will evolve to an absorbing
state with positive probability.
Next we identify the LRE of the 2k-neighbor model. We denote by Zk+1 the set
of absorbing states. We denote by Zk+10 the set of absorbing states of type (1), by
Zm0 the set of absorbing states of type (2). As we did in the two-neighbor model, we
categorize the absorbing states in Zk+10 according to the number of clusters in the
state. We denote by Zk+10 (M) the subset of Z
k+1
0 in which there are M clusters in
the city. So the set of segregated states is Zk+10 (2). Since the transitions depicted
in Lemma 4 and Lemma 5 are irrelevant to the advantageous node, we can expect
the same transitions in the 2k-neighbor model without advantageous node. As the
immediate extensions of Lemma 4 and Lemma 5, we have the following lemmas.
Lemma 8: In the 2k-neighbor model, when the nodes in the city are homogenous,
the absorbing states in Zk+10 (M) compose a mutation-connected component, where
M < 2
⌊
n
k+1
⌋
.
Lemma 9: In the 2k-neighbor model, when the nodes in the city are homogenous,
it is possible to move from an absorbing state in Zk+10 (M) to an absorbing state in
Zk+10 (M − 2) via a series of single mutations, where M < 2
⌊
n
k+1
⌋
.
Now we identify the LRE of the 2k-neighbor model when the nodes in the city are
homogenous:
Proposition 2: When the nodes in the city are homogenous, the set of LRE in the
2k-neighbor residential model is the set of segregated states.
Proof : For any absorbing state in Zm0 , every player has exactly k neighbors of own
type. If any two players of different types change their locations, it will make some
other players unsatisfied. We consider the following swap: an A-player on the border
of an A-cluster and a B-player on the border of a B-cluster are selected and change
their location by mistake. Once this swap takes place, the rest A-players in the
A-cluster and the rest B-players in the B-cluster have fewer than k neighbors of
their own types. These players become unsatisfied and will change their locations
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with positive probability. This will make more players unsatisfied and change their
locations with positive probability, and finally, we will reach a state in Zk+10 . Thus,
to leave an absorbing state in Zm0 , we need just one mutation. On the other hand,
in an absorbing state in Zm0 , every cluster has strictly fewer than (k + 1) players,
the absorbing states in Zm0 have more clusters than the absorbing states in Z
k+1
0 . To
reach an absorbing state in Zm0 from states in Z
k+1
0 , we need to increase the number
of clusters in the city, which requires strictly more than one player to move at once.
Thus, the transition cost from states in Zk+10 to an absorbing state in Zm0 is strictly
larger than one.
We know by lemma 8 that the states in Zk+10 (2) compose a mutation-connected
component. To leave Zk+10 (2), we need (k + 1) pairs of players change their location
at once. Thus, the transition cost from a segregated state to a non-segregated ab-
sorbing state is at least (k+1). By Lemma 9, the transition from any non-segregated
absorbing state to a segregated state can be induced via a series of single mutations.
Let L denote the total number of absorbing state in the model, all the segregated
states have a z-tree with least resistance of L − 1. While for any non-segregated
absorbing state, every z-tree has at least one edge which is larger or equal to (k+ 1),
so the resistances of these z-trees are at least L+ k. Therefore, the set of segregated
states (Zk+10 (2)) is the set of LRE. 
As shown in the original Schelling model, when players interact with more neigh-
bors, the set of segregated states is still the unique LRE.
5.2 Multiple advantageous nodes in the 2k-neighbor model
Recall that in the two-neighbor model, an intermediate state is created with the help
of the advantageous node, so that the absorbing states with different number of clus-
ters can be connected via single mutations. It turns out that almost all the absorbing
states are included in the set of LRE. However, one advantageous node creates only
one intermediate absorbing state. In the 2k-neighbor model, the transition cost from
Zk+10 (M) to Z
k+1
0 (M + 2) is (k + 1). With just one advantageous node, the absorb-
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ing states in Zk+10 (M) cannot reach the states in Z
k+1
0 (M + 2) via single mutations.
Therefore, we need k adjacent advantageous nodes to enlarge the set of LRE.
Lemma 10: In the 2k-neighbor model with k adjacent advantageous nodes, the
absorbing states can be categorized into the following three types:
(1′) The states in which every cluster has no fewer than (k + 1) players;
(2′) The states in which every cluster has m players, where m < k + 1, and k = 2pm
or k = (2p+ 1)m− 1, p = 1, 2, 3 . . . , for any k < 2n−1
2
;
(3′) The states in which at least one player in the advantageous nodes has fewer than
k neighbors of own type, and every cluster containing normal nodes has no fewer
than (k + 1) players.
Proof: From Lemma 7, we know that the states of type (1′) and type (2′) are
absorbing in the 2k-neighbor model without advantageous nodes. Since the presence
of the advantageous nodes does not change the utility of players in these states, these
states are still absorbing in the 2k-neighbor model with k adjacent advantageous
nodes. For the states of type (3′), they are not absorbing in the 2k-neighbor model
without advantageous nodes. They become absorbing due to the presence of the
advantageous nodes. Consider a state where every cluster containing normal nodes
has no fewer than (k+ 1) players. If in such a state every player in the advantageous
node has at least k neighbors of her own type, the state belongs to type (1′). If at
least one player in the advantageous node has fewer than k neighbors of her own
type, she is satisfied due to the existence of the advantageous nodes. Then, the state
is absorbing and belongs to type (3′). The states different from type (1′), type (2′)
and type (3′) are not absorbing, and will evolve to an absorbing state of type (1′) or
type (3′) with positive probability. 
We denote by Zk+1k the set of absorbing states of type (1
′), by Zmk the set of
absorbing states of type (2′), by Z(k+1)
′
k the set of absorbing states of type (3
′). Since
the states in Z(k+1)
′
k is not absorbing when the nodes in the city are homogeneous,
and become absorbing after the advantageous nodes are introduced, these states are
the intermediate absorbing states. Furthermore, the absorbing states in Zk+1k can be
categorized into subsets based on the number of clusters. We denote by Zk+1k (M) the
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set of absorbing states in Zk+1k withM clusters. Since the transition within Z
k+1
k (M)
and the transition from Zk+1k (M) to Z
k+1
k (M−2) can be induced via single mutations
without the help of the advantageous nodes, Lemma 8 and Lemma 9 can be applied
to the 2k-neighbor model with k adjacent advantageous nodes. So we can have the
following lemma immediately:
Lemma 11: In the 2k-neighbor model with k adjacent advantageous nodes, the
absorbing states in Zk+1k (M) compose a mutation-connected component when M <
2
⌊
n
k+1
⌋
. It is possible to move from an absorbing state in Zk+1k (M) clusters to an
absorbing state in Zk+1k (M − 2) clusters via a series of single mutations, where M <
2
⌊
n
k+1
⌋
.
In the following lemma, we consider the transition from the absorbing states in Zk+1k
with fewer clusters to an absorbing state in Zk+1k with more clusters.
Lemma 12: In the 2k-neighbor model with k adjacent advantageous nodes, the
transition from an absorbing state in Zk+1(M) to a state in Zk+1(M + 2) can be
induced via single mutations, if at least one of the clusters in z has no fewer than
(3k + 2) players.
Proof: The proof of the lemma is analogous to Lemma 6. Consider an absorbing
state z in Zk+1k (M), in which (1) the k advantageous nodes are occupied by B-players,
(2) at least(k + 1) B-neighbors on the left hand side of the advantageous nodes and
(3) at least (k + 1) B-neighbors on the right hand side of the advantageous nodes,
z = BB . . . BB︸ ︷︷ ︸
m′1
B∗B∗ . . . B∗B∗︸ ︷︷ ︸
k
BB . . . BB︸ ︷︷ ︸
m′′1
AA . . . AA︸ ︷︷ ︸
m2
. . . BB . . . BB︸ ︷︷ ︸
mM−1
AA . . . AA︸ ︷︷ ︸
mM
,
i.e. m′1 + k + m′′1 = m1 > 3k + 2, and m′1,m′′1 > k + 1. In each step, one B-player
located in the advantageous node swap with an A-player on the border of an A-cluster
which has no less than (k + 2) players by mistake. After k steps, we will obtain a
state z′ via a series of single mutations:
z′ = BB . . . BB︸ ︷︷ ︸
m′1
A∗A∗ . . . A∗A∗︸ ︷︷ ︸
k
BB . . . BB︸ ︷︷ ︸
m′′1
AA . . . AA︸ ︷︷ ︸
m2
. . . BB . . . BB︸ ︷︷ ︸
mM−1
AA . . . AA︸ ︷︷ ︸
mM
.
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In the state z′, we have (M + 2) clusters, every cluster containing normal nodes has
no fewer than (k + 1) players, the A-cluster who occupied the advantageous nodes
has k players. Apparently, z′ belongs to Z(k+1)
′
k . In the next step, another A-player
on the border of a cluster can swap to a B-player next to the advantageous nodes
with one mutation and will be satisfied there. Now we reach an absorbing state z′′:
z′′ = BB . . . BB︸ ︷︷ ︸
m′1
AA∗A∗ . . . A∗A∗︸ ︷︷ ︸
k+1
BB . . . BB︸ ︷︷ ︸
m′′1
AA . . . AA︸ ︷︷ ︸
m2
. . . BB . . . BB︸ ︷︷ ︸
mM−1
AA . . . AA︸ ︷︷ ︸
mM
.
We find that there are (M + 2) clusters in z′′ , each of the clusters has no fewer than
(k+ 1) players, so we have z′′ ∈ Zk+1k (M + 2). Thus, when at least one of the clusters
has (3k+ 2) players, it is possible to move from an absorbing state in Zk+1k (M) to an
absorbing state in Zk+1k (M + 2) via a series of single mutations. 
By Lemma 12, we know the condition under which we can increase the number of
cluster in the absorbing states via single mutations. Next we characterize the LRE
in 2k-neighbor model with k adjacent advantageous nodes.
Proposition 3: Let r be the remainder when n is divided by (k + 1). In the 2k-
neighbor model with k adjacent advantageous nodes,
1) If r = k, the set of LRE includes all the absorbing states in Zk+1k ;
2) If r < k, the set of LRE includes all the absorbing states in Zk+1k /Z
k+1
k (2b nk+1c).
Proof: Consider an absorbing state z with (2b n
k+1
c−2) clusters, i.e. z ∈ Zk+1k (2b nk+1c−
2). The largest possible cluster of z can have (2k + 2 + r) players. By Lemma 12,
we know that if z can reach states in Zk+1k (2b nk+1c) via single mutations, one of its
clusters has to have no fewer than (3k + 2) players. In this case, the remainder r
should be no less than k, i.e. r > k. By the definition of remainder, we know that
r < k + 1, and r is a natural number, so we have r = k.
Now we consider the following two cases.
a) When r = k, the largest possible cluster in a state in Zk+1k (2b nk+1c − 2) has
(3k + 2) players. By lemma 12, the states in Zk+1k (2b nk+1c) and the rest of the
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absorbing states in Zk+1k can reach each other via single mutations. By Lemma 11
and Lemma 12, all the absorbing states in Zk+1k are included in the same mutation-
connected component.
b) When r < k, the largest possible cluster in a state in Zk+1k (2b nk+1c−2) has fewer
than (3k+2) players. By lemma 12, the state in Zk+1k (2b nk+1c) cannot be reached from
other states in Zk+1k via single mutations. By Lemma 11 and Lemma 12, the states
in Zk+1k /Z
k+1
k (2b nk+1c) can reach each other via single mutations. Thus, the states in
Zk+1k /Z
k+1
k (2b nk+1c) are included in the same mutation-connected component.
Next, we consider the transitions between the absorbing states in Z(k+1)
′
k and the
absorbing states in Zk+1k . We know that the only difference between the states in
Z
(k+1)′
k and the states in Z
k+1
k is the set of players in the advantageous nodes.
i) First, we show that, given every cluster containing the normal nodes has at least
(k + 1) players, a state in Zk+1k can reach a state in Z
(k+1)′
k via single mutations. To
reach an absorbing state in Z(k+1)
′
k from a state z ∈ Zk+1k , we need that there exists
at least one advantageous node in z, such that (1) the players in the normal nodes
will be satisfied regardless of which type of player is located in this advantageous
node, (2) the advantageous node is not on the border of a cluster. If there exist
such an advantageous node, consider the swap between the players located in the
advantageous node and an opposite type player in the normal node, who is on the
border of a cluster with at least (k + 2) players,
z = BB . . . BB︸ ︷︷ ︸
mM
A∗A∗ . . . A∗A∗AA . . . AA︸ ︷︷ ︸
m1
BB . . . BB︸ ︷︷ ︸
m2
AA . . . AA︸ ︷︷ ︸
m3
. . . BB . . . BB︸ ︷︷ ︸
mM−2
AA . . . AA︸ ︷︷ ︸
mM−1
.
After the swap, we obtain an state z′,
z′ = BB . . . BB︸ ︷︷ ︸
mM
A∗B∗ . . . A∗A∗AA . . . AA︸ ︷︷ ︸
m1
BB . . . B︸ ︷︷ ︸
m2−1
AA . . . AA︸ ︷︷ ︸
m3+1
. . . BB . . . BB︸ ︷︷ ︸
mM−2
AA . . . AA︸ ︷︷ ︸
mM−1
.
In z′, every cluster containing the normal nodes has at least (k + 1) players, the
B∗-player has fewer than k B-neighbors, so we know that z′ ∈ Z(k+1)′k .
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ii) Next, we show that a state in Z(k+1)
′
k can reach a state in Z
k+1
k via single muta-
tions. the transition from states in Z(k+1)
′
k to states in Z
k+1
k is simply the transition
in the opposite direction. In each step, choose a player in the advantageous node
who has fewer than k neighbors of own type, and swap with a opposite type player
on the border of a cluster. Iterating this process until every cluster in the city has at
least (k + 1) players, then we will obtain a state in Zk+1k .
Thus, the transition between the states in Z(k+1)
′
k and the states in Z
k+1
k can be
induced via a series of single mutations.
Then, we consider the transition between the absorbing states in Zmk and the
absorbing states in Zk+1k . As shown in Proposition 2, one mistake is enough to
leave the basin of attraction of the states in Zmk . On the other hand, to induce the
transition from an absorbing state in Zk+1k to an absorbing state in Z
m
k , we need to
increase the number of clusters in the city. To increase the number of clusters via
single mutations, we need at least one of the clusters has no fewer than (3k + 2)
players, so that the states in Zk+1k (2b nk+1c) and the rest of the absorbing states in
Zk+1k can reach each other via single mutations. However, states in Z
m
k have strictly
more than 2b n
k+1
c clusters. Thus, we cannot induce a transition from an absorbing
state in Zk+1k to an absorbing state in Z
m
k via single mutations, which implies that
the transition cost is strictly larger than one.
Finally, we consider the set of LRE. Let L denote the total number of absorbing
states in the model. Recall that when r = k, all the absorbing states in Zk+1k form a
mutation-connected component. All the z-trees directing to the states in Zk+1k have
the least resistance of L− 1, and there does not exist any other absorbing state, such
that the z-tree directing to this state has the least resistance which is strictly less
than L − 1. Thus, in this case, all the absorbing states in Zk+1k are included in the
set of LRE. By the same argument, when r < k, all the states in Zk+1k /Z
k+1
k (2b nk+1c)
are included in the set of LRE. 
Note that Proposition 1 is a special case of Proposition 4, when k = 1.
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6 Simulations
The main question in this section is whether the presence of an advantageous node
can lead us to a more integrated society, when the parameter values are finite. In
our simulation study, we replicate the theoretical model in which players of two
types locate in a one-dimensional circular city with one advantageous node. As a
benchmark, we also consider the case where the nodes in the city are homogeneous,
and this is equivalent to the theoretical model in Young (1998). We refer to the model
with one advantageous node as M1, and refer to the model of homogeneous nodes as
M2.
To measure the degree of segregation, we count the number of clusters in the city,
which is also employed in Schelling (1969, 1971a, 1971b, 1978). A state with more
clusters represents a more integrated city, and in a completely segregated state there
are only 2 clusters.
 = 0.1  = 0.01  = 0.001  = 0.0001
n = 10 M1 3.18 2.52 2.48 2.52
M2 3.02 2.25 2.15 2.24
n = 20 M1 5.62 3.69 3.33 3.89
M2 5.48 3.33 2.93 3.45
n = 40 M1 10.52 6.16 5.41 7.14
M2 10.42 5.77 4.58 6.24
Table 1: Average cluster number
We run 100 simulations with 100000 periods for each model. All the simulations
start from a random state, in which players of two types are randomly distributed in
the circular city. In each period, one pair of players is drawn at random. If the pair can
make a Pareto-improving swap, they will exchange their positions with probability
(1−), and stay where they are with probability . If the pair is not Pareto-improved
after exchanging their locations, they will stay with probability (1 − ), and swap
with probability .
Table 1 shows the average number of clusters for both models with different pop-
ulation sizes and error rates. We can find that M1 have more clusters than M2 in
53
all cases. So the main conclusion of our theoretical model holds, the advantageous
node do lead to a more integrated society. We can also have some insights into the
results with comparative static analysis.
First, given error rate, the average number of clusters increases with the population
size. The reason is as the population size increases, the pair of players which can
make Pareto-improving swap will be drawn with lower probability. Consider a state
z with 4 clusters, one of which has only one A-player.
z = A . . . A
...A∗A . . . A︸ ︷︷ ︸
m1
B . . . B︸ ︷︷ ︸
mi
A︸︷︷︸
1
B . . .B︸ ︷︷ ︸
mM
A . . . A
...A∗A . . . A︸ ︷︷ ︸
m1
.
This unsatisfied player can make a Pareto-improving swap with two B-players (Both
B-players are indicated in bold). When the population size is ten, the probability that
the isolated A-players and one of the emboldened B-players are chosen is 2/C92 ≈ 0.05;
when the population size is 40, the probability reduce to 2/C392 ≈ 0.002.
Second, given the population size, the average number of clusters increases with
the error rate. This observation is due to the conflict between the population size and
error term. In the stochastical stability analysis, we assume that an error occurs with
probability , which approaches 0. However, as we mentioned above, the undisturbed
dynamics in our model will take place with lower probability as the number of players
increases. To ensure that the error term will correctly reflect the long-run behavior
of the dynamics, it should be extremely small.
 = 0.1  = 0.01  = 0.001  = 0.0001
n = 10 5.2% 11.6% 15% 12%
n = 20 2.6% 10.7% 13.8% 13%
n = 40 1% 6% 18.1% 14%
Table 2: Relative increase in cluster number
Therefore, the simulation gives a more significant result in the cases where the
error rate is small enough. Table 2 summarizes the relative increase in cluster number
from M2 to M1. We find that when  = 0.001, the effect of the advantageous node
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is most significant. This is because the mistakes in the model not only provide the
opportunity of transitions between absorbing states, but also provide the opportunity
of the transitions from absorbing state to transient state. To reach LRE from mid-
term equilibria in finite periods, the error rate should not be too small; on the other
hand, the error rate should be restricted to prevent the transition from absorbing
state to transient state occurring frequently.
7 Conclusion
We have shown that the result of the standard Schelling model is not robust with
respect to location heterogeneity. In particular, if there are locations such that an
agent residing there is impartial to the composition of her neighborhood, integrated
profile may also emerge as LRE. When the neighborhood size is larger than two, then
more than one advantageous nodes with that property may be needed to obtain this
result.
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Social Coordination and Network Formation
in Two Groups
000
Abstract
In this paper, we consider a model of social coordination and network
formation, where players of two groups play a 2×2 coordination game when
they are connected. Players in one group actively decide on whom they play
with and on the action in the game, while players in the other group decide
on the action in the game only and passively accept all the connections
from other group. The players in the active group can connect to a limit
number of opponents in the other group. We find that the selection of
long-run outcome is determined by the population size of the groups, not
the overall population size of them. If either group’s population size is
small in comparison to the linking restriction, all players will choose the
risk-dominant equilibrium, while when both groups are sufficiently large in
population, the players of two groups will coordinate on the payoff dominant
action.
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1 Introduction
In many social and economic interactions, agents can benefit from coordination on
the same strategies or common standards. Many researchers have explored the in-
teractions within the same population.15 Nevertheless, a lot of interactions feature
different groups of agents, with interactions only happening across groups. Think,
for instance, of vertical relationship in a retail industry, where a retailer may more
frequently interact with manufacturers located upstream, rather than with his hor-
izontal competitors. It is reasonable to expect that rather than interacting with all
manufacturers, the interaction will be described by a social network. Moreover, due
to the market structures or the price elasticities in different industries, the relation-
ships between the upstream firms and the downstream firms may be not symmetric.
Consider the example of the retail industry again. It is more likely that the retail
giants, e.g. Wal-Mart, Tesco, Carrefour, actively decide on their interaction partners
among the manufacturers, whereas the manufacturers are in the passive position
against these retail giants.
We aim to understand the implications of the action choices and interaction struc-
tures among the two groups in a setting where the interaction structure is the one-
sided decision of one group. We present a simple model of action choice and network
formation, encompassing two groups of players, called theM -group and the F -group.
The players in the M -group decide on the action and the set of interaction partners,
while the players in the F -group decide on the action and accept all the links from
the M -players. An M -player and an F -player play a 2× 2 coordination game when
they are connected. In each period, players of two groups choose links and/or actions
to maximize (myopically) their respective payoffs. We are interested in the scenario
where the M -players can sustain a limited number of links à la Staudigl and Wei-
denholzer (2014). In this case, the M -players might not connect to all the F -players.
15For global interaction models see, e.g., Kandori et al. (1993), Kandori & Rob (1995), Young (1993). For local
interaction models see Blume (1993, 1995), Ellison (1993, 2000) and Alós-Ferrer and Weidenholzer (2008); see also
Weidenholzer (2010) for a recent survey on local interaction models focusing on social coordination.
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We postulate that if an F -player has no incoming link from M -players, she behaves
as if she plays against the entire population of M -players.
To understand the dynamics of the model, we first characterize its static behavior.
We find that there are two Nash equilibria: the risk-dominant convention where all
players in both groups choose the risk-dominant action, and the payoff dominant con-
vention where all players in both groups choose the payoff dominant action. To give
a long run prediction, we assume that players occasionally make mistakes. Different
from the previous works on network formation and social coordination, we have two
groups of players in the model. The equilibrium selection is determined by the popu-
lation sizes of both groups, not the overall population of the two groups. Only when
both populations are large in comparison to the number of links that may be sus-
tained, the players of two groups will coordinate on the payoff dominant action. On
the contrary, if either of the two groups is small, even though the overall population
of the two groups is large, all players will choose the risk-dominant equilibrium.
The intuition underlying the main results is as follows. Due to the coordination
of the game, if all players in one group choose the same action, the other group
will converge to the same action with positive probability. The transition from one
convention to another has two paths. In one path, every M -player switches to a new
action first, and F -players converge to that action in the following periods. In the
other path, every F -player switches to a new action first, and the M -players follow
by coordination. The transition is determined by the path with the fewest mistakes.
We examine the following two situations. In the first situation, everyM -player can
link to all F -players. The transitions between the conventions are determined by the
path where the smaller group switch first, and the risk-dominant action will spread
to the two groups in the long run. This is because in this situation, there is only one
interaction structure among the groups. Under such a fixed interaction structure,
the risk-dominant action has a larger basin of attraction. In the second situation,
the M -players can only link to a fraction of F -players due to the linking constraint.
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Thus, the M -players can choose different interaction structures in the conventions.
The interaction structures among the groups will influence the transitions among
the conventions. The necessary number of mutations to reach the payoff dominant
convention is independent of the population sizes of both groups. While the transition
from the payoff dominant convention to the risk-dominant convention needs a fraction
of players in the smaller group to make mistakes. The risk-dominant convention will
be easier to reach and more difficult to leave when the population sizes of both groups
are small. When the populations of both groups are large in comparison to the linking
constraint, the payoff dominant action will be selected in the long run.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The related previous litera-
ture will be reviewed in the next section. Section 3 presents the model and discusses
the main techniques used. Section 4 presents the main result. Section 5 concludes.
2 Literature Review
There is a branch of literature considers scenarios where in addition to the action
choice in a game, the agent can select the set of interaction partners. In Jackson and
Watts (2002), interaction requires the consent of both parties. The linking cost has
a significant impact on the selection of equilibrium: the risk-dominant convention is
selected when the linking cost is low; the risk-dominant convention and the payoff
dominant convention are both selected when the linking cost is high. In Goyal and
Vega-Redondo (2005), a player connects with other players by unilaterally investing
in costly pairwise links. They show that if the cost of maintaining a link is relatively
low, players will coordinate on the risk-dominant action, and will coordinate on the
efficient action otherwise. Hojman and Szeidl (2006) present a model where players
pay for their out-degree links, and receive payoffs from all path-connected neighbors.
Bilancini and Boncinelli (2014) present a model of social coordination in a population
made of two different types, players have a preference for own-type but can observe
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others’ type only after first interaction. They find that the selection of conventions
in the long run depends on the cost of mismatch in type. When the cost of mismatch
in type is small with respect to the cost of mismatch in action, the unique long run
outcome is the payoff dominant convention; when the cost of mismatch in type is large,
both conventions coexist in the long run. Staudigl and Weidenholzer (2014) consider
a model of social coordination and network formation with constrained interaction.
They show that if this constraint of links is relatively small with respect to the
population size, the payoff dominant convention will emerge in the long run. The
main difference between our model and the previous works is that in our model,
interactions take place across the groups. The M -players support links to the F -
players, who accept all the incoming links. Agents on both sides of the link receive
the payoff, only the M -players pay the cost of supporting the links.
A different branch of literature studies the models where in addition to the action
choice in a game, the agents choose their interaction partners by choosing among
several locations. This branch of literature includes Ely (2002), Oechssler (1997),
Bhaskar and Vega-Redondo (2004). In these models, players can choose the location
to play the game, which makes the player can easily avoid miscoordination by “voting
by feet”. Thus, players will choose the payoff dominant action in the long run. Anwar
(2002) present multiple location models where each of the locations has a capacity
constraint and some agents are immobile. The constraint will limit the movement
between locations, in this context the payoff dominant convention will not be selected.
The present paper is also related to the literature in the study of matching markets.
In the early literature (Gale and Shapley 1962, Roth and Sotomayor 1989), players
match in a two-sided market, like labor markets or marriage market, but there’s no
further interaction after the matching. Later Kranton and Minehart (2003) introduce
a buyer-seller network, and find that when buyers and sellers can form links strategi-
cally and compete in the matching markets, the efficient network structure is always
an equilibrium outcome. Jackson and Watts (2008) generalize the matching problems
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by presenting the bipartite games, where players choose both a strategy in a game
and a partner with whom to play the game. They prove the existence of equilibria in
the bipartite games. In a companion paper, Jackson and Watts (2010) consider games
played among multiple groups of players. As in Jackson and Watts (2008), players
in the game choose their strategies as well as their interaction partners across the
groups, those who are dissatisfied will rematch and reach a new equilibrium. They
show that the long-run outcome depends on the relative sizes of population in differ-
ent groups. In Pongou and Serrano (2013), men and women form a fidelity network
by having relationships with the opposite type. They show that different cultures
of gender relationship lead to different long-run networks. When women are easier
to change their partners, all agents have the same number of partners in the long
run. Otherwise, all women will match with a small fraction of men. Different from
these works in this branch of literature, in our paper, we focus on the coordination
game between the two groups. Moreover, in the matching process of our paper, the
relationship between the two groups is asymmetric, players in the M -group makes
the decision of interaction structure unilaterally, and F -players accept all linking
invitation from M -players.
3 The Model
We consider two groups of players, called theM -players and the F -players. We denote
byM = {1, 2, . . .m} the set ofM -players, and denote by F = {m+1,m+2, . . .m+f}
the set of F -players. Each i ∈M chooses a subset of F -players with whom to play a
fixed bilateral game. Formally, we have gij ∈ {1, 0} for any two players i ∈M , j ∈ F .
We say that gij = 1 when player i forms a link to player j, otherwise gij = 0. Let
gi = (gi(m+1), gi(m+2), . . . gi(m+f)) be the link formation choice of anM -player i. There
is no direct link between players in the same set, i.e. for any two players i, j ∈ M ,
gij = gji = 0. A profile of link formation choices, one for each M -player is denoted
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by g = (g1, g2 . . . , gm). We refer to g as the network of interaction. For each player
i ∈M ∪F , let N(i) be the set of players who are directly connected to i, we say N(i)
is player i’s neighborhood. For an F -player i, we denote by di the in-degree of player
i, i.e. the number of players she is passively linked to.
Two players from different groups play a coordination game when they are directly
connected. Each player i can choose an action ai ∈ {A,B}. We denote by u(ai, aj)
the payoff of player i choosing action ai given that player j chooses action aj. The
payoffs in the coordination game are given in the following matrix:
A B
A a, a c, d
B d, c b, b
We assume that a > d and b > c, so that (A,A) and (B,B) are Nash equilibria.
We assume that b > a, so (B,B) is the payoff dominant equilibrium. We assume that
a+ c > b+ d, so the equilibrium (A,A) is risk-dominant in the sense of Harsanyi and
Selten (1988), i.e. A is the unique best response against an opponent playing both
strategies with equal probability. We denote by q∗ = b−c
a+b−c−d , the Nash equilibrium
(A,A) is risk-dominant implies that q∗ < 1
2
. We assume that payoff flows to both
sides of a link. We also assume that the payoffs in the bilateral game are all positive,
i.e. a, b, c, d > 0, so that F -players have no incentive to refuse links from M -players.
Let aM = (aM1 , aM2 . . . aMm ) be the profile of action choice of M -players and let aF =
(aF1 , a
F
2 , . . . a
F
f ) be the profile of action choice of F -players.
For every M -player, in addition to her action choice in the coordination game, she
also decides on which F -players to link to. We focus on a scenario in which every
M -player can support at most ` links, where ` 6 f and ` ∈ N, where N denotes
the natural number. There is at most one link between every pair of players. We
denote the cost of sustaining a link by k. On the other hand, F -players offer no links
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but accept all the linking invitations from M -players. There is no restriction in the
number of incoming links that F -players may receive.
A pure strategy of an M -player consists of her choice of action and the set of
players she wants to link to. The set of linking strategies of player i is denoted
by Gi = {0,1}f . The set G = G1 × G2 × · · · × Gm is the space of pure linking
strategies of all M -players. We denote the strategy profile of an M -player i by
sMi = (ai, gi) ∈ SMi = {A,B} × Gi, let sM = (sM1 , . . . sMm ) ∈ SM =
∏
i∈M S
M
i be the
profile of strategies of the M -group; a pure strategy of an F -player j is simply her
choice of action in the coordination game sFj = aj ∈ SFj = {A,B}. The profile of
strategies of the F -group is sF = aF ∈ SF = ∏i∈F SFi .
The overall payoff of a player is determined by the sum of payoffs she receives from
the coordination games net of the linking cost. Given the strategy profile ofM -player
i, sMi = (ai, gi), and the strategies of other players, s−i = (sM1 , . . . sMi−1, sMi+1, . . . , sMm , sF ),
her overall payoff is given by:
UMi (s
M
i , s−i) =
∑
j∈F
giju(ai, aj)− k
∑
j∈F
gij
Given the strategies of other players, s−i = (sM , sF1 . . . sFi−1, sFi+1, . . . sFm+f ), the
overall payoff of a player i ∈ F from playing sFi = ai is:
UFi (s
F
i , s−i) =
∑
j∈M
gjiu(ai, aj) +
p
M
∑
j∈M
u(ai, aj),
where p = 0 if
∑
j∈M gji > 0, and p ∈ (0, db ) if
∑
j∈M gji = 0. The first term
of the payoff function is the payoffs from coordination games with her neighbors
when she has any incoming links from M -players, the second term is her payoff from
interacting with the wholeM -group, here we assume that p is sufficiently small so that
we have u(ai, aj) > p
∑
j∈M u(ai, aj) for any ai, aj. According to this payoff function,
an unlinked F -player receives a lower payoff from non-connected interaction with the
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wholeM -group, while if anM -player is connected to someM -players, the payoff from
coordination games with her neighbors is always higher than that from non-connected
interaction. Note that this assumption implies that when an F -player does not have
any incoming links, she behaves as if she plays against the entire population of M -
players, i.e. we postulate that she plays the field when she is unlinked. On one hand,
this assumption may reflect the expectation that in the future the F -player will be
connected to some M -player; on the other hand, from a more technical perspective,
it avoids arbitrary behavior of F -players, which may determine the prediction of the
model. See the discussion in footnote.16
In the following, we denote by s = (sM , sF ) = (aM , g, aF ) ∈ S = SM × SF the
state in which the action profile of M -players is aM , the action profile of F -players is
aF , and g represents the linking decision of M -players. We denote by mA and fA the
number of players choosing action A in the M -group and the F -group respectively.
It follows that the number of B-players in the F -group is (f − fA), and the number
of B-players in the M -group is (m−mA). We further denote by −→A the action vector
in which every player in a certain group adopts the same action A, and by
−→
B the
action vector in which every player in a certain group adopts the same action B, e.g.
we have aM =
−→
A if every M -player chooses action A.
Time is discrete, denoted by t = 1, 2, 3, · · · . At each period t, a state is given by the
strategy profile ofM -players and F -players, specifying the action played and the links
established. At each period t, every player may revise her strategy with exogenous
probability λ ∈ (0, 1). When such a revision opportunity arises, she chooses a myopic
best response to the other players’ strategies in the preceding period. Formally, in
period t, player i chooses the strategy:
16In this present model, the actions ofM -players are determined by the distribution of the F -group. Due to random
tie breaking in case of payoff ties, if the unlinked F -players can arbitrarily change their action, the optimal action
for M -players may change without mutation. This will turn out that the payoff dominant equilibrium will be LRE
in most cases.
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si(t) ∈ argmaxsi∈Si Ui(si, s−i(t− 1)),
where s−i(t − 1) represents the strategy profiles of the other players except i in the
previous period. If a player has multiple best replies, we assume that she randomly
chooses one of them with exogenously given probability. We assume that with prob-
ability ∈(0,1), an updating player makes mistakes and simply picks a strategy –
consisting of action and/or linking choice – at random. We assume that  is inde-
pendent across players, time and payoffs. We refer to the process without mistakes
( = 0) as the unperturbed process and refer to the process with mistakes ( > 0) as
the perturbed process.
3.1 Review of Techniques
We have denoted by s a state of the model, which specifies how M -players and F -
players are connected and choose their actions in graph g, and we have denoted by
S the set of states. An absorbing state is a state in which no alternative state s′ can
be reached from s without mutations.
The perturbed process is ergodic, i.e. it has a unique invariant distribution µ(),
which summarizes the long-run behavior of the process, independently of initial con-
ditions. The limit invariant distribution (as the rate of experimentations tends to
zero) µ∗ = lim→0 µ() exists and is an invariant distribution of the process without
mistakes. The limit invariant distribution singles out a stable prediction of the pro-
cess without mistakes ( = 0), in the sense that, for any  small enough, the play
approximates that described by µ∗ in the long run. The set of states S that supports
µ∗ are called stochastically stable states or long-run equilibria (LRE).
We will rely on the characterization of the set of LRE developed by Ellison (2000).
Given two absorbing set X and Y , denote c(X, Y ) as the minimal number of muta-
tions necessary for a direct transition from X to Y , this direct transition from X to
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Y does not go through any other absorbing set, and c(X, Y ) > 0. Define a path from
X to Y as a finite sequence of absorbing sets P = {X = S0, S1, . . . SL(P ) = Y }, where
L(P ) is the length from X to Y , i.e. the number of elements of the sequence minus
1. Let W (X, Y ) be the set of all paths from X to Y . We extend the cost function to
paths by c(P ) =
∑L(p)
k=1 c(Sk−1, Sk), then the minimal number of mistakes require for
a transition, direct or indirect, from X to Y is given by:
C(X, Y ) = min
P∈W (X,Y )
c(P ).
The result of Ellison (2000) can be summarized as follow: The radius of an ab-
sorbing set X is defined as
R(X) = min{C(X, Y ) | Y is an absorbing set, Y 6= X},
i.e. the minimal number of mistakes necessary for leaving X.
We define the coradius of X as the maximal number of mistakes necessary for
every other absorbing set to enter the basin of attraction of X, formally:
CR(X) = max{C(Y,X) | Y is an absorbing set, Y 6= X}.
Ellison (2000) provides a powerful result that if R(X) > CR(X) for a given
absorbing set X, then X is the unique stochastically stable set.
Lemma 1 (Ellison, 2000) Let X be an absorbing set, if R(X) > CR(X), then the
LRE are the states in X.
This is the Radius-Coradius Theorem of Ellison (2000). Note that if there are
only two absorbing set, we have C(X, Y ) = R(X) = CR(Y ) and C(Y,X) = R(Y ) =
CR(X); when C(X, Y ) = C(Y,X), both absorbing sets are LRE.
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4 Coordination in Two Groups
Note that as the M -players choose their actions and links simultaneously, we can
characterize the optimal behavior of an M -player by splitting his decision into two
parts: First, to chooses the optimal set of links for both actions A and B, and second,
to decide which action to adopt, given the optimal set of links.
Let us start by considering anM -player’s optimal linking strategy. As we consider
the case of low linking cost (k < d), every link is valuable for M -player regardless of
her own action choice and her potential opponent’s action. Thus, an M -player will
always form all her ` links to F -players.
Note that, an A-player will prefer interacting with another A-player over interact-
ing with a B-player. If an M -player chooses action A, her optimal linking strategy
will be: First, to establish links to A-players in the F -group; second, if there are spare
links after connecting to all possible A-players, to use the rest of her links connecting
to B-players in the F -group. Similarly, anM -player choosing action B will optimally
link up first to B-players in the F -group, and then link up to A-players if she has
spare links.
Given the optimal linking strategy, the action choices of M -players depend on the
distribution of action in the F -group (aF ). We denote by V (T, aF ) the maximal payoff
that anM -player with action T ∈ {A,B} can obtain from linking up optimally, given
aF . So we have
V (A, fA) = amin{`, fA}+ c(`−min{`, fA})
and
V (B, fA) = d(`−min{`, f − fA}) + bmin{`, f − fA}
An M -player will choose A with probability one if V (A, fA) > V (B, fA), will choose
B with probability one if V (A, fA) < V (B, fA), and will randomize when V (A, fA) =
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V (B, fA).
Depending on the relationship between `, f and fA, we have four cases:
(i) fA > ` and f − fA > `
In this case, both A-players and B-players may fill up all their links with F -players
of their own kind. Since (B,B) is the payoff dominant equilibrium, M -players will
earn a higher payoff by adopting B, so B is the optimal action in this case.
(ii) fA < ` and f − fA > `
In this case, B-players can fill up all their links to F -players of their own kind, but
A-players do not find sufficiently many F -players of their own kind to fill up all the
slots. Again B is the optimal action in this case.
(iii) fA > ` and f − fA < `
In this case, A-players can fill up all their links to F -players of their own kind, but
B-players cannot. An M -player will choose A if V (A, fA) > V (B, fA), which turns
to
a` > d(`− f + fA) + b(f − fA),
rearranging terms yields
fA > f − (a− d)`
b− d .
Conversely, note that if when fA < f − (a−d)`
b−d , V (B, f
A) > maxV (A, fA) = a`, i.e.
if the number of B-players in F -group is larger than (a−d)`
b−d , it is always optimal for
M -players to play B. We denote by ψ1 = (a−d)`b−d .
(iv) fA < ` and f − fA < `
70
In this case, neither A- nor B-players in the M -group will fill up all their links
with F -players of their own kind. The M -players will choose A with probability one
if
fA >
(b− d)f − (c− d)`
a+ b− c− d .
We denote by ψ2 = f − (b−d)f−(c−d)`a+b−c−d .
We summarize the conditions under which players choose either of the two actions
in the following table:
Table 1 Action Choice Thresholds
fA > ` fA < ` fA > ` fA < `
f − fA > ` f − fA > ` f − fA < ` f − fA < `
Choose A with prob. 1 Never Never fA > f − ψ1 fA > f − ψ2
Choose B with prob. 1 Always Always fA < f − ψ1 fA < f − ψ2
Randomize Never Never fA = f − ψ1 fA = f − ψ2
Next we consider the optimal strategy of F -players. For an F -player i, let dAi
be the number of A-players in player i’s neighborhood, let dBi be the number of B-
players in player i’s neighborhood. Formally, we have dAi = #{j ∈ N(i) | aj = A}
and dBi = #{j ∈ N(i) | aj = B}.17 Recall that there are two kinds of F -players:
Those who are connected to at least one M -player (
∑
j∈M gji > 0), and those who
are not (
∑
j∈M gji = 0).
(1) When
∑
j∈M gji > 0, the action of an F -player i depends on d
A
i . When
dAi > q
∗di, she will choose action A with probability one, when dAi < q∗di, she
will choose action B with probability one, and when dAi = q∗di, she will randomize
between A and B.
(2) When
∑
j∈M gji = 0, the action of an F -player i depends on a
M . When
mA > q∗m, she will choose action A with probability one, when mA < q∗m, she
will choose action B with probability one, and when mA = q∗m, she will randomize
between A and B.
17We define #{X} to be the cardinality of a set X.
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Before we characterize the set of absorbing states, we denote by
−→
A g = {s ∈
S | ai = A, ∀i ∈ M ∪ F and di = `, ∀i ∈ M} the set of states where all players
choose action A, and the M -players link up with the maximal number of F -players
possible,
−→
B g is defined accordingly. Note that if f > `,M -players have more potential
interaction partners than available links. Since the M -players will randomize among
their strategies in case they are indifferent, the process will move among different
interaction structures without mistake. This implies that the absorbing sets contain
more than one element.
Lemma 2: The sets
−→
A g and
−→
B g are the only absorbing sets.
Proof: First note that since every connection carries a positive net-payoff, M -
players will use up all their links. From the analysis above, we find that if all players
in one group choose the same action, it is optimal for all players in the other group
to choose that action. Consider a state s ∈ −→A g ∪ −→B g, a revising player will always
remain at her current action in the following period. Furthermore, since we assume
that ties are broken randomly in case of payoff ties, for each pair of states si, sj ∈ −→A g
(and also for each pair in
−→
B g), there is a positive probability of moving between them
without mutation. It follows that states in
−→
A g forms an absorbing set, and states in
−→
B g forms an absorbing set.
Next, consider any state s /∈ −→A g ∪ −→B g. Consider the M -players, with positive
probability, they will all choose the same action, (since they all facing the same
action distribution among F -players (aF )). Thus, we can move to a state where
aM =
−→
A or aM =
−→
B with positive probability. After that, since all the F -players
face the M -group, in which all of them choose the same action, it follows that they
too all change that same action. 
Before we proceed to characterize the set of Long-run Equilibria, we discuss the
transitions between the absorbing sets. As shown in Lemma 2, if all players in one
group choose the same action, it is optimal for all players in the other group to choose
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that action. A state in which aM =
−→
T or aF =
−→
T , where T ∈ {A,B}, lies in the
basin of attraction of the absorbing set
−→
T g. Thus, for the transitions to
−→
T g, we
have two paths: the path via states where aM =
−→
T and the path via states where
aF =
−→
T . Note that in the transition to
−→
T g via states where aF =
−→
T , we need
that every F -player will choose T with positive probability; in the transition to
−→
T g
via states where aM =
−→
T , we need that every M -player will choose T with positive
probability. In both paths, the mutations may occur among the F -players and the
M -players. We analyze two scenarios: one where the number of F -players equals the
number of links that M -players can support (f = `), and one where the number of
F -players is larger than the number of links that M -players can support (f > `).
When f = ` (see Figure 1 for instance), every M -player links to all F -players,
which implies that every F -player hasm incoming links. First, consider the transition
from
−→
A g to
−→
B g. We want to calculate how many players need to switch in order to
move from a state in
−→
A g to a state in which either aF =
−→
B or aM =
−→
B , so that
the process will move to
−→
B g with positive probability. We denote by PF (A,B) the
minimal number of players who have to switch from action A to action B such that
the transition from
−→
A g to
−→
B g occurs with positive probability via a state in which
aF =
−→
B , and PM(A,B) is defined accordingly.
Note that if an F -player has no fewer than m(1− q∗) M -players choosing B in her
neighborhood, she will switch to B with positive probability. Thus, with dm(1− q∗)e
mistakes,18 we can move to a state in which aF =
−→
B , from which we reach a state in
−→
B g with positive probability. So we have PF (A,B) = dm(1 − q∗)e. Likewise, if an
M -player has no fewer than f(1− q∗) F -players choosing B in her neighborhood, she
will switch to B with positive probability. With df(1 − q∗)e mistakes, we can move
to a state in which aM =
−→
B , and consequently reach a state in
−→
B g with positive
probability. Thus, we have PM(A,B) = df(1− q∗)e.
Next we denote by PM(B,A) the minimal number of players who switch from
18We define dxe to be the smallest integer not less than x.
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Figure 3: Interaction structure when m = 6, f = ` = 3
action B to action A by mistake such that the transition from
−→
B g to
−→
A g occurs with
positive probability via a state in which aM =
−→
B , and PF (B,A) is defined accordingly.
With a similar analysis to the transition from
−→
A g to
−→
B g, it is straightforward to obtain
that PF (B,A) = dmq∗e.
Thus, when f = `, the transition cost between the absorbing sets are given by:
CR(
−→
B g) = R(
−→
A g) = min{PM(A,B), PF (A,B)} = dmin{m, f}(1− q∗)e
and
CR(
−→
A g) = R(
−→
B g) = min{PM(B,A), PF (B,A)} = dmin{m, f}q∗e
When f > `, M -players have more potential interaction partners than available
links. Since players are assumed to randomize among their strategies in case they are
indifferent, the process will move among different interaction structures without mis-
take. (See Figure 2 for different interaction structures in an absorbing set.) Further,
note that the transitions among different absorbing sets will depend on the particular
interaction structures the process might visit. Recall that there are two paths from
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Figure 4: (a) An M -player influence structure when m = 6, f = 5, ` = 3; (b) An
F -player influence structure when m = 6, f = 5, ` = 3
one absorbing set to another, one path via states where every M -player chooses the
same action, and the other path via states where every F -player chooses the same
action. In the following lemmas, we identify the transition cost of the two paths from
−→
A g to
−→
B g and the two paths from
−→
B g to
−→
A g.
Lemma 3 If f > `, the transition costs via states where every M -player chooses the
same action are given as follow:
PM(A,B) =
 1 if f > `+
(a−d)`
b−d
dψ2e − (f − `) + 1 if ` < f < `+ (a−d)`b−d
and
PM(B,A) =

df − ψ1e − `+ 1 if f > 2`
df − ψ1e − (f − `) + 1 if 2` > f > `+ (a−d)`b−d
df − ψ2e − (f − `) + 1 if ` < f < `+ (a−d)`b−d
.
The proof is given in the Appendix. Let us provide some technical intuition for
the transition from
−→
A g to
−→
B g via states where aM =
−→
B . Similar arguments can be
applied to the transition from
−→
B g to
−→
A g via states where aM =
−→
A . In the lemma,
we find that interaction structures where one M -player can influence the highest
number of F -players play an important role. We refer to such interaction structures
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as M-player influence structures (See Figure 2(a) for an example). Under such an
interaction structure, min{`, f − `} F -players receive their only incoming link from
one M -player. If this M -player changes, then also all of these F -players will change.
If f > `+ (a−d)`
b−d , following oneM -player’s mutation, more than dψ1e F -players switch
to B, which in turn makes all the remainingM -players switch.19 If f < `+ (a−d)`
b−d , the
M -player induces (f − `) F -players to switch. In order for the remaining M -players
to switch, we need other (dψ2e − (f − `)) mutations among the F -players.
The following lemma characterizes the transition costs among absorbing sets via
states where all F -players choose the same action.
Lemma 4 If f > `, the transition costs via states where every F -player chooses the
same action are: PF (A,B) = dm(1− q∗)e and PF (B,A) = dmq∗e.
The proof is given in the Appendix. Let us provide some technical intuition for the
transition from
−→
A g to
−→
B g via states where aF =
−→
B . To understand the mechanism
behind the transitions, consider an interaction structure where all the links of M -
players are concentrated on ` F -players, and (f − `) F -players are not connected.
We refer to such interaction structures as F -player influence structures (See Figure
2(b) for an example). Under an F -player influence structure, when dm(1 − q∗)e
M -players switch to B, both the F -players with incoming links and the F -players
without incoming link will switch. In the lemma, we show that there does not exist an
alternative interaction structure, under which all F -players change with strictly fewer
mutations amongM -players. Similar arguments can be applied to the transition from
−→
B g to
−→
A g via states where aF =
−→
A .
Combining Lemma 3 and Lemma 4, if f > `+ (a−d)`
b−d , the transition costs between
19One M -player can influence min{`, f − `} F -players in an M -player influence structure. It is always true that
min{`, f−`} > dψ1e when f > `+ (a−d)`b−d , so in this case the transition cost from
−→
Ag to
−→
B g via states where aM =
−→
B
is one.
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the absorbing sets are given by:
CR(
−→
B g) = R(
−→
A g) = min{PM(A,B), PF (A,B)} = min{1, dm(1− q∗)e}
and
CR(
−→
A g) = R(
−→
B g) = min{PM(B,A), PF (B,A)} = min{df−ψ1e−min{f−`, `}+1, dmq∗e}.
If ` < f < `+ (a−d)`
b−d , the transition costs between the absorbing sets are given by:
CR(
−→
B g) = R(
−→
A g) = min{PM(A,B), PF (A,B)} = min{dψ2e−(f−`)+1, dm(1− q∗)e}
and
CR(
−→
A g) = R(
−→
B g) = min{PM(B,A), PF (B,A)} = min{df−ψ2e−(f−`)+1, dmq∗e}.
4.1 Long-run Equilibria
Now we can identify the set of LRE (S) using the Radius-Coradius Theorem
(Lemma 1). Based on the analysis above, we will distinguish three cases: when
f = `, ` < f < `+ (a−d)`
b−d and f > `+
(a−d)`
b−d .
Proposition 1 When f = `, the sets of LRE are
S = −→A g if dmin{m, f}q∗e < dmin{m, f}(1− q∗)e;
S = −→A g ∪ −→B g if dmin{m, f}q∗e = dmin{m, f}(1− q∗)e .
The proof is given in the Appendix. In Proposition 1, we find that when the
players of two groups are fully connected, the transition cost between
−→
A g and
−→
B g
is determined by the population size of the smaller group, and the risk-dominant
equilibrium is always selected. For, the transition from one absorbing set to another
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requires one of the two populations to change. If f = `, the number of mutations
required will be a fraction of one population. Thus, if one is smaller than the other,
the transition with the fewest mutations will involve the smaller population switching
first. As by risk dominance, q∗ < 1
2
, the risk-dominant equilibrium is always selected.
Moreover, the payoff dominant equilibrium may be selected in addition to a risk-
dominant equilibrium if q∗ is close to 1
2
, and/or if the size of the smaller population
is small.
In the following two propositions, we will identify the set of LRE when f > `.
Proposition 2 When ` < f < `+ (a−d)`
b−d , there exist two thresholds, m and m, with
m < m, such that
(1) If m < m, the set of LRE is given by
S = −→A g if dmq∗e < dm(1− q∗)e and S = −→A g ∪ −→B g if dmq∗e = dm(1− q∗)e.
(2) If m > m:
The set of LRE is S = −→A g under the following conditions: i) If ψ2 ∈ Z20 and
` < f < 2(c−d)`
b+c−a−d ; or ii) If ψ2 /∈ Z, f is even, and ` < f < 2(c−d)`b+c−a−d ; or iii) If ψ2 /∈ Z, f
is odd, and ` < f < 2(c−d)`−(a+b−c−d)
b+c−a−d ;
The set of LRE is S = −→B g under the following conditions: i) If ψ2 ∈ Z and 2(c−d)`b+c−a−d <
f < ` + (a−d)`
b−d ; or ii) If ψ2 /∈ Z, f is even, and 2(c−d)`b+c−a−d < f < ` + (a−d)`b−d ; or iii) If
ψ2 /∈ Z, f is odd, and 2(c−d)`+(a+b−c−d)b+c−a−d 6 f < `+ (a−d)`b−d ;
The set of LRE is S = −→A g ∪−→B g under the following conditions: i) If ψ2 ∈ Z and f =
2(c−d)`
b+c−a−d ∈ Z; or ii) If ψ2 /∈ Z, f is odd, and 2(c−d)`−(a+b−c−d)b+c−a−d 6 f < 2(c−d)`+(a+b−c−d)b+c−a−d .
Proposition 3 When f > ` + (a−d)`
b−d , the set of LRE is given by S =
−→
B g if m > 1q∗ ,
S = −→A g ∪ −→B g if 1 6 m 6 1q∗ .
The proof is given in the Appendix. Let us provide some technical intuition for
the result of these two propositions. As we stated above, the transition from one
20We define Z to be the set of integers.
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absorbing set to another requires one of the two populations to change to the other
action, so there are two paths to induce the transition among the absorbing sets.
The transition cost among the absorbing states are determined by the path with
least mutations. When the population size of the M -group is sufficiently small, the
path via states where every F -player chooses the same action needs fewer mutations.
By Lemma 4, we know that the transitions via this path require the fewest mutations
under an F -player influence structure, and the risk-dominant convention (
−→
A g) will
always be selected. When the population size of theM -group is sufficiently large, the
path via states where everyM -player chooses the same action needs fewer mutations.
By Lemma 3, we know that the transitions via this path require the fewest mutations
under an M -player influence structure. Under an M -player influence structure, the
transition cost from the risk-dominant equilibrium to the payoff dominant equilibrium
is independent of the population size of both groups. While the transition from the
payoff dominant equilibrium to the risk-dominant equilibrium needs a fraction of
players in F -group to make mistakes. The risk-dominant equilibrium is selected when
the population size of the F -group is small, and the payoff dominant equilibrium will
be selected as the population size of the F -group gets larger. In particular, when
the population size of the F -group is sufficiently large (f > ` + (a−d)`
b−d ), under an
M -player influence structure, the mutation of one M -player is sufficient to reach the
payoff dominant equilibrium. Thus,
−→
B g will be the LRE in this case.
5 Conclusion
We have presented a model of social coordination and network formation between two
groups of players, where the players of one group support a limited number of links
to the players of the other group. This paper has shown that the population sizes of
the two groups have a powerful impact on the equilibrium selection. When the both
populations are large in comparison to the number of links that may be sustained,
the players of two groups will coordinate on the payoff dominant action. On the
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contrary, if either of the two groups is small, all players will choose the risk-dominant
equilibrium.
There are several natural extensions to the research presented here. First, it would
be desirable to consider the case where the cost of supporting and maintaining a link
is high. As shown in Goyal and Vega-Redondo (2005) and Staudigl and Weidenholzer
(2014), for high costs of supporting links, we could find that payoff dominant con-
vention arises for a wider range of parameters. Second, one could imagine a model
where the F -players may reject or accept incoming links. In this case, we could find
the states with mixed strategies become absorbing.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 3: First, we consider the transition from
−→
A g to
−→
B g via states
where aM =
−→
B . Thus, we start with the case where the mutations only occur among
the F -players. Let mAB be the minimal number of F -players switching from A to B,
such that every M -player will choose B when given revision opportunity. According
to Table 1, whenever the number of B-players in the F -group is larger or equal to
`, the M -players will choose B. They will also prefer B over A when the M -players
choosing B cannot fill up all their links to B-players (f − fA < `) in the following
two cases: in the case where at the relevant threshold the M -players choosing A fill
up all of their links (fA > `), every M -player will choose B if there are less than
(f − ψ1) F -players choosing A; and in the case where M -players choosing A cannot
fill up all of their links (fA < `), the M -players will prefer B if there are less than
(f − ψ2) F -players choosing A. Thus, we consider the following two cases:
i) When fA > ` after the mutations, it follows from Table 1 that every M -player
will choose B with positive probability if no less than ψ1 F -players are choosing B.
Thus, in this case mAB = dψ1e. This case will happen if the remaining number of
A-players in the F -group is larger or equal to `, that is f − dψ1e > `. Since f, ` ∈ N,
this holds when f − ψ1 > `, which yields f > `+ (a−d)`b−d .
ii) When fA < ` after the mutations, it follows from Table 1 that every M -player
will choose B with positive probability if there are less than (f − ψ2) F -players
choosing A, hence, at least ψ2 F -players should switch to B. Thus, in this case
mAB = dψ2e. This case will happen if the remaining number of A-players in the
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F -group is smaller than `, that is f − dψ2e < `, which holds if f − ψ2 < `. This
translates into f < `+ (a−d)`
b−d .
Recall that in addition we needmAB to be less than `. We find that if f > `+ (a−d)`
b−d ,
it is always true that ψ1 < `. When f < `+ (a−d)`b−d , we need ψ2 < `, which translates
into f < ` + b−c
a−c`. Since ` +
b−c
a−c` > 2`, ψ2 < ` always holds when f < ` +
(a−d)`
b−d .
Thus, we find that:
mAB =
 dψ1e if f > `+
(a−d)`
b−d
dψ2e if ` < f < `+ (a−d)`b−d
.
Recall that F -players with incoming links choose their action based on the action
distribution in their neighborhood. Thus, if an F -player has only one incoming link,
her action choice only depends on the action of her sole opponent. This observation
will influence the nature of the transition among the absorbing sets. Then, in partic-
ular, consider a set of a set of F -players, such that each of these F -players has only
one incoming link from the same M -player, if this M -player switches, all F -players
link to him switch to the same action as he chooses. Now we want to understand
under which interaction structure, one M -player can influence the highest number
of F -players. In any absorbing state, M -players will form all of their ` links. Thus,
(m − 1) M -players can have all their links to a subset of ` F -players. This leaves
(f − `) F -players for the remaining M -player to connect to. Since this M -player will
support ` links, the number of F -players that only connect to this M -player is given
by min{`, f − `}. Figure 2(a) illustrates an absorbing state where two F -players only
have one incoming link from one M -player. With one mutation of the M -player,
there will be min{`, f − `} F -players switching with positive probability. We name
such an interaction structure the M -player inference structure.
Now we consider the transition cost from
−→
A g to
−→
B g via states where aM =
−→
B
in the aforementioned interaction structure. We already know that in an M -player
inference structure, the number of F -players with one incoming link depends on
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the number of F -players (f), thus, we consider two cases when f > 2` and when
2` > f > `.
First, if f > 2`, in an M -player inference structure, one M -player can support all
her ` links to the F -players, each of whom has the only one incoming link from the
M -player. Thus, if the M -player switches to B, there will be ` F -players choosing B
with positive probability. We know that when f > ` + (a−d)`
b−d , we need m
AB = dψ1e
F -players to choose B so that B is the best reply for every M -player. Since it is
always true that ` > ψ1, when f > 2`, we are able to reach a state in which aM =
−→
B
with just one mutation, that is PM(A,B) = 1.
Second, if 2` > f > `, in an M -player inference structure, one M -player can link
to (f−`) F -players, each of whom has the only incoming link from theM -player. We
know that the transition from
−→
A g to a state where aM =
−→
B requires at least mAB F -
players to switch from A to B, so we distinguish two cases: i) when 2` > f > `+ (a−d)`
b−d
and ii) when `+ (a−d)`
b−d > f > `. i) When 2` > f > `+
(a−d)`
b−d , we need dψ1e F -players
to choose B so that every M -player will prefer B over A. Consider an M -player
inference structure (as Figure 2(a)), in which one M -player connects to the highest
number of F -players, each of whom has the only incoming link from this M -player.
If this M -player switches to B, (f − `) F -players will switch to B with positive
probability. Since it is always true that f−` > dψ1e in this case, we are able to reach
a state in which aM =
−→
B with just one mutation, that is PM(A,B) = 1. ii) When
` + (a−d)`
b−d > f > `, we need dψ2e F -players to choose B so that every M -player will
prefer B over A. Given an M -player inference structure, if one M -player switches to
B, (f − `) F -players will switch to B with positive probability. Since f − ` < dψ2e in
this case, in addition to the M -player, we still need that [dψ2e − (f − `)] F -players
who are not only connected to the M -player to also switch to B by mistakes. Thus,
when `+ (a−d)`
b−d > f > `, we find that PM(A,B) = dψ2e− (f − `) + 1. To sum up, we
have:
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PM(A,B) =
 1 if f > `+
(a−d)`
b−d
dψ2e − (f − `) + 1 if f < `+ (a−d)`b−d
.
Next, we consider the transition from
−→
B g to
−→
A g via states where aM =
−→
A . We
denote by mBA the minimal number of F -players switching from B to A, such that
every M -player will choose A when given revision opportunity. According to Table
1, whenever the number of B-players in the F -group is larger or equal to `, the M -
players will never choose A. Thus, for M -players to choose A, f − fA < ` must be
true. Now there are two cases where A is the best reply for every M -player. i) When
the M -players choosing A can fill up all of their links to the A-players in F -group
(fA > `), we can infer from Table 1 that mBA = df − ψ1e in this case. ii) When
the M -players choosing A cannot fill up all of their links to the A-players in F -group
(fA < `), according to Table 1, we have mBA = df − ψ2e in this case. The first
case happens if the number of F -players choosing A is larger or equal to `, that is
df−ψ1e > `, which holds if f−ψ1 > `, hence we have f > `+ (a−d)`b−d . The second case
happens if the number of F -players choosing A is less than `, that is df − ψ2e < `,
which holds if f − ψ2 < `. We can translate this into f < ` + (a−d)`b−d . Recall that in
both cases, the remaining number of F -players choosing B should be less than `, that
is f −mBA < `. When f > `+ (a−d)`
b−d , it must be the case that f −mBA < `. When
f < ` + (a−d)`
b−d , we need that f − df − ψ2e < `. From the analysis above, we know
that ψ2 < ` must be true, thus, we always have f −mBA < ` when f < ` + (a−d)`b−d .
Thus, we have:
mBA =
 df − ψ1e if f > `+
(a−d)`
b−d
df − ψ2e if f < `+ (a−d)`b−d
.
To complete the transition from
−→
B g to
−→
A g via states where aM =
−→
A with the
minimal number of mutations, again we consider the M -player inference structures.
In such an interaction structure, if oneM -player switches to A, min{`, f−`} F -players
85
will choose A with positive probability. We distinguish two cases when f > 2` and
when 2` > f > `.
First, if f > 2`, in an M -player inference structure, one M -player can support
all her ` links to the F -players, each of whom has the only incoming link from the
M -player. We know that when f > `+ (a−d)`
b−d , we need m
AB = df −ψ1e F -players to
choose A so that A is the best reply for every M -player. Once the M -player switches
to A by mistakes, there will be ` F -players choosing A with positive probability.
Since it must be the case that df − ψ1e > ` when f > 2`, to make A the best
reply for every M -player, in addition to the M -player, we need (df − ψ1e − `) F -
players who are not connected to the M -player to switch to A. Thus, we find that
PM(B,A) = df − ψ1e − `+ 1 in this case.
Second, if 2` > f > `, in an M -player inference structure, one M -player can link
to (f − `) F -players, each of whom has only one incoming link from the M -player.
We know that the transition from
−→
B g to a state where aM =
−→
A requires at least mBA
F -players to choose A, so we distinguish two cases when 2` > f > `+ (a−d)`
b−d and when
` + (a−d)`
b−d > f > `. i) When 2` > f > ` +
(a−d)`
b−d , every M -player will prefer A over
B if there are df − ψ1e F -players choosing A. Once the M -player switches to A by
mistakes, there will be (f−`) F -players choosing A with positive probability. Since it
must be the case that df −ψ1e > f − ` when 2` > f > `+ (a−d)`b−d , to make A the best
reply for every M -player, in addition to the M -player, we need [df − ψ1e − (f − `)]
F -players who are not only connected to the M -player to switch to A. So we have
PM(B,A) = df − ψ1e − (f − `) + 1 in this case. ii) When ` + (a−d)`b−d > f > `, every
M -player will prefer A over B if there are df − ψ2e F -players choosing A. Once
the M -player switches to A by mistakes, there will be (f − `) F -players choosing
A with positive probability. Since it must be the case that df − ψ2e > f − ` when
`+ (a−d)`
b−d > f > `, in addition to theM -player, we need [df−ψ2e− (f−`)] F -players
who are not only connected to the M -player to switch to A, so that every M -player
prefer A over B. Thus, we have PM(B,A) = df − ψ2e − (f − `) + 1 in this case. To
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sum up, we have:
PM (B,A) =

df − ψ1e − `+ 1 if f > 2`
df − ψ1e − (f − `) + 1 if 2` > f > `+ (a−d)`b−d
df − ψ2e − (f − `) + 1 if ` < f < `+ (a−d)`b−d
.
Proof of Lemma 4: First, we consider the transition from
−→
A g to
−→
B g via states
where aF =
−→
B . Thus, we consider the case where the mutations occur among the
M -players. We denote by fAB the minimal number ofM -players switching from A to
B, such that every F -player will choose B when given revision opportunity. We claim
that in this case, fAB > dm(1 − q∗)e, and prove it via contradiction. Assume that
fAB = γ and γ < dm(1 − q∗)e, that is when γ M -players switch to B by mistakes,
every F -player will choose B with positive probability. Recall that if an F -player i
has at least one incoming link (
∑
j∈M gji > 0), she will switch to B when at least
(1 − q∗) of her neighbors choose B; if she has no incoming link (∑j∈M gji = 0), she
will switch to B when at least (1−q∗) ofM -players choose B. Since γ < dm(1−q∗)e,
an F -player with no incoming link will not switch to B when fAB = γ. Thus, we
consider an interaction structure where every F -player has at least one incoming link.
Under this interaction structure, the players from M -group support m` links in all,
and there are γ` links supported by B-players. To make sure that every F -player
prefers B over A, we need that for every F -player, at least d(1−q∗)e of her neighbors
choose B, that is we need dBi > ddi(1 − q∗)e for ∀i ∈ F . Summing up all the F -
players, we need that
∑
i∈F d
B
i >
∑
i∈F ddi(1 − q∗)e. For the right hand side of the
inequality, according to the property of ceiling function, dxe+dye > dx+ye, we have∑
i∈F ddi(1−q∗)e > d(1−q∗)
∑
i∈F die = d(1−q∗)m`e. We also know that the left hand
side of the inequality represents the total number of links supported by B-players, so
we have
∑
i∈F d
B
i = γ`. Thus, the inequality implies that γ` > dm`(1 − q∗)e, which
contradicts γ < dm(1−q∗)e. So we prove the claim that fAB > dm(1−q∗)e. Thus, to
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reach a state where aF =
−→
B with the minimal number of mutations, we consider the
following interaction structure: All the M -players support their ` links to the same
set of F -players, and the rest of the F -players are left unlinked (See Figure 2(b) for
instance). We name such an interaction structure the F -player inference structure.
Given this interaction structure, every F -player with ` incoming links will choose B
with positive probability if at least dm(1− q∗)e M -players switch to B by mutation.
Once these mutations occur, the F -players with no incoming links (
∑
j∈M gji = 0)
will also choose B as the best reply to the action distribution in M -group. Thus, the
minimal transition cost from
−→
A g to
−→
B g via states in which aF =
−→
B is dm(1 − q∗)e,
establishing that PF (A,B) = dm(1− q∗)e.
Next, we consider the transition from
−→
B g to
−→
A g via states where aF =
−→
A . To
reach a state where aF =
−→
A with the minimal number of mutations, we still consider
the F -player inference structure as Figure 2(b). Analogously to the previous analysis,
every F -player will choose A if at least dmq∗e M -players switch to A. Thus, we can
obtain that PF (B,A) = dmq∗e. 
Proof of Proposition 1: We already know that CR(
−→
B g) = R(
−→
A g) = dmin{m, f}(1− q∗)e
and CR(
−→
A g) = R(
−→
B g) = dmin{m, f}q∗e when f = `. By risk-dominance, we
know that q∗ < 1
2
, so we have min{m, f}q∗ < min{m, f}(1 − q∗), which implies
that dmin{m, f}q∗e 6 dmin{m, f}(1− q∗)e. Thus, according to Lemma 1, when
f = `, the sets of LRE of the model are given by S = −→A g if dmin{m, f}q∗e <
dmin{m, f}(1− q∗)e; S = −→A g ∪ −→B g if dmin{m, f}q∗e = dmin{m, f}(1− q∗)e. 
Proof of Proposition 2: We know by Lemma 3 and Lemma 4 that PF (A,B) =
dm(1− q∗)e , PM(A,B) = dψ2e − (f − `) + 1, PF (B,A) = dmq∗e, and PM(B,A) =
df − ψ2e − (f − `) + 1.
(1) When dm(1− q∗)e < dψ2e − (f − `) + 1 and dmq∗e < df − ψ2e − (f − `) + 1,
which implies that m < min{ψ2−f+`+1
1−q∗ ,
`−ψ2+1
q∗ }, the path via states where every F -
player chooses the same action requires fewer mistakes to complete the transition.
Thus, when m < min{ψ2−f+`+1
1−q∗ ,
`−ψ2+1
q∗ }, the radius and coradius of the absorbing
88
sets are given by: CR(
−→
B g) = R(
−→
A g) = PF (A,B) = dm(1− q∗)e and CR(−→A g) =
R(
−→
B g) = PF (B,A) = dmq∗e. By risk-dominance, we have q∗ < 12 , which implies that
dmq∗e 6 dm(1− q∗)e. Thus, the set of LRE are S = −→A g if dmq∗e < dm(1− q∗)e;
S = −→A g ∪ −→B g if dmq∗e = dm(1− q∗)e.
(2) When dm(1− q∗)e > dψ2e − (f − `) + 1 and dmq∗e > df − ψ2e − (f − `) + 1,
we have m > max{ψ2−f+`+1
1−q∗ ,
`−ψ2+1
q∗ }. Thus, when m > max{ψ2−f+`+11−q∗ , `−ψ2+1q∗ }, it
requires fewer mistakes to complete the transitions among absorbing sets via states
where every M -player chooses the same action. Thus, the radius and coradius of
the absorbing sets are given by: CR(
−→
B g) = R(
−→
A g) = dψ2e − (f − `) + 1 and
R(
−→
B g) = CR(
−→
A g) = df − ψ2e − (f − `) + 1.
First, we find that when dψ2e > df − ψ2e, we have R(−→A g) > CR(−→A g), establishing
that S = −→A g in this case. If ψ2 ∈ Z, the condition holds if ψ2 > f − ψ2, which
translates into f < 2(c−d)`
b+c−a−d . If ψ2 /∈ Z, the condition holds if dψ2e > 12(f + 1). If f
is even, we can translate the condition into ψ2 > 12f , which yields f <
2(c−d)`
b+c−a−d . If f
is odd, the condition implies that ψ2 > 12(f + 1), which yields f <
2(c−d)`−(a+b−c−d)
b+c−a−d .
Next, we find that when dψ2e < df − ψ2e, we have R(−→B g) > CR(−→B g), establishing
that S = −→B g in this case. If ψ2 ∈ Z, the condition holds if ψ2 < f − ψ2, which
translates into f > 2(c−d)`
b+c−a−d . If ψ2 /∈ Z, the condition holds if dψ2e < 12(f + 1). If f
is even, we can translate the condition into ψ2 < 12f , which yields f >
2(c−d)`
b+c−a−d . If f
is odd, the condition implies that ψ2 6 12(f − 1), which yields f > 2(c−d)`+(a+b−c−d)b+c−a−d .
Last, we find when dψ2e = df − ψ2e, we have S = −→A g ∪ −→B g. If ψ2 ∈ Z, the
condition holds when ψ2 = 12f , which yields f =
2(c−d)`
b+c−a−d . If ψ2 /∈ Z, the condition
holds only if f is odd and dψ2e = 12(f + 1), we can translate the equation into
2(c−d)`+(a+b−c−d)
b+c−a−d > f >
2(c−d)`−(a+b−c−d)
b+c−a−d .
Proof of Proposition 3: We already know by Lemma 3 and Lemma 4 that
PF (A,B) = dm(1− q∗)e , PM(A,B) = 1, PF (B,A) = dmq∗e and PM(B,A) =
df − ψ1e − min{f − `, `} + 1. Since the transition cost between absorbing sets is
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a natural number and should be no less than one, thus, it must be the case that
min{PM(B,A), PF (B,A)} > 1 and dm(1− q∗)e > 1. So we have
CR(
−→
A g) = R(
−→
B g) = min{PM(B,A), PF (B,A)} = 1
and
CR(
−→
A g) = R(
−→
B g) = min{PM(B,A), PF (B,A)} > 1.
Since PM(B,A) = df −ψ1e−min{f − `, `}+ 1 > 1 must be true when f > `+ (a−d)`b−d ,
both absorbing sets are LRE only if dmq∗e = 1, which implies that 1 6 m 6 1
q∗ .
−→
B g
is the unique LRE if dmq∗e > 1, which implies that m > 1
q∗ . Thus, we have S =
−→
B g
if dmq∗e > 1, and S = −→A g ∪ −→B g if m 6 1q∗ . 
